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ABSTRACT

Driverless cars are expected to transform society in many ways. Since nowadays most
collisions are due to human error, safety is among the most anticipated benefits of the
technology. The promise of near zero fatalities on roads appears in many industry
statements and government reports. Because of that, every collision, especially
involving fatalities, receives much attention from the media and public. That kind of
scrutiny resembles the early days of the conventional automobiles. In those days,
automobiles – also called “horseless carriages” – were not well received by the majority
of the population. Cars brought conflicts and fatalities on roads to a level never seen
before. The automobile industry, using public relations, shifted society’s perception
about who belongs to the roads, and who should be blamed for the rise of fatalities.
That shift influenced legislation and tort law in motor-vehicle centric ways. It also
created cities with infrastructure focused on the automobile at the expense of other
means of transportation. Today, one of the most difficult challenges for driverless cars
is the unpredictability of pedestrian and cyclist behaviour. To accelerate the
deployment of the technology, some are considering the necessity of law enforcement
against pedestrians and other street users. Centred on urban environments,
pedestrians and cyclists, and with an interdisciplinary and advocacy-oriented
approach, this thesis seeks to contribute to the debate about the safety and
deployment of driverless cars, its influence on law and legislation, and how a carcentred view of the technology may limit its potentialities.
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INTRODUCTION

Right now, in Canada and throughout the world, academics, lawmakers and
companies are debating a technology that is expected to revolutionize our lives and
our cities. The driverless car comes with the promise of solving many of today’s
problems on our roads and cities. The most proclaimed promise is the safety it can
bring to streets, with the expectation of reducing deaths on roads to numbers close
to zero.
We have been using the conventional automobile in our cities now for more
than a century. It is a central piece of the urban architecture not only in the way our
cities were and are built. With time, it became the central object and concern of the
legal framework about mobility. This work proposes a critical observation of elements
from the past and the present as a form to understand possible ways driverless cars
may be used in the pursuit of safer roads and urban environments that respects the
rights of pedestrians and cyclists, helping to create cities where equity and accessibility
are priorities.
This work, rather than seek closed answers, proposes a search for questions
that benefits that pursuit. It is divided into three chapters. After this introduction,
chapter 1 investigates the changes that occurred in the last century that made possible
the centrality of the automobile in our cities. The new technology of driverless cars is
presented in chapter two. Initially, it is argued that driverless cars must be defined as
1

robots. The perspectives for deployment, the governmental and legislative debates
are also presented. By the end of the chapter, a brief discussion about the first fatalities
involving self-driving cars is made. The centrality of the safety argument in the
deployment of the technology is debated in the last chapter. From that point,
driverless cars’ difficulty in dealing with the unpredictability of pedestrians and cyclists
will be discussed. It will be argued that challenge must not be an excuse to develop
more law enforcement against pedestrians and cyclists. It will be also argued that to
achieve the objectives of the safety argument, the robot-car must be part of a complex
system where it may be integrated as one of the many solutions for better cities. It will
be also questioned if framing this technology within the values of the automobile era
is a way of limiting its potential to help us to achieve more equity.
Throughout the work, many names are used to designate the technology of
the robot-cars: autonomous cars, driverless, self-driving. The terminology that must
be used for the technology is debated in academia, companies and government.
Despite the importance of those debates, that is not, however, the focus of this work.
It was decided, therefore, for the most used terms to be employed without entering
in the details of the significance of each of the names used.
The focus of this study is driverless cars of level 4 and 5 of autonomy.1 In some
moments, however, conventional cars with Advanced Driver Assistance Systems

1

See section 2.2.

2

(ADAS) are part of the discussion. Also, it should be noted that the focus of the work
is the relation between these cars and active transportation in urban environments.

3

CHAPTER 1
FROM KILLER MACHINE TO FUTURAMA
Conflicts between people moving within the cities have always existed. The
advent of the automobile, however, elevated those conflicts and the number of
fatalities on streets to a new stage.
In this chapter, the early days of the automobile will be presented as a way
of understanding how it became a symbol of desire and freedom. The history of the
automobile helps us to understand changes in the aspects of our cities and also shifts
in some perspectives of court decisions and legislation. The chapter starts with the
early cyclists and how they paved the movements that would help spread the
centrality of the automobile throughout the last century. Then it moves to the
opposition that part of the population had against the new machine, how the
manufacturers diminished hostility against their product, and how they created
perspectives for a future constructed by and for cars.

1.1 – Before motorists: the wheelmen
Nowadays, if one turns on the television in any news report on some
“controversy” surrounding the creation of bike lanes, or if one reads some debates
on social media, it seems that cyclists and motorists are on complete opposite sides
of an urban war. Historically, however, that was not always the reality. Cyclists from
4

the late 19th century and early 20th century had a central role in the spread of the
motor culture and dominance of automobiles. Motorists and cycling aficionados
were not only side by side in most of their claims and objectives: they were usually
the same people. As Reid wrote: “If a paternity test were possible, it could be shown
that the first motor cars had much more cycle DNA in them than carriage DNA. The
cycle was a vital part of the trunk of the automobile’s family tree.”2
The founder and editor of The Autocar - the world’s first weekly motoring
magazine - Henry Sturmey, for example, wrote a classic book on cycling and was a
cycling journalist until his last day. During the 1890s he was at the same time editor
of both The Autocar and The Cyclist.3 Another example, Frederick Simms, founder of
the Automobile Club, was in his youth member of the Cyclists’ Touring Club.4 Many
of the inventors pursuing the creation of the automobile were cycling aficionados
and bicycle workshop owners, or, at least, used the bicycle as the base of their
experiments. No fewer than 64 of the early motor companies - like GMC, Chevrolet
and Cadillac - had their origins as bicycle factories and workshops. It was a common
fact that motor companies owners, like Dodge and the founders of Aston Martin proud of their motor engines - were also passionate cyclists.5 To build a quadricycle

Carlton Reid, Roads Were Not Built For Cars: How Cyclists were the First to Push for Good Roads &
Became the Pioneers of Motoring, 1st ed (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2015) at xiv.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid at xix.
5
Ibid at xiv.
2

5

for his experiments, Ford used bicycle elements; and Benz constructed his first selfpropelled vehicle - a tricycle - with bicycle parts.
A perfect example of that connection between bicycles and automobiles was
the Canadian company - with a self-explanatory name - The National Cycle &
Automobile Co. Limited. In The Canadian Magazine, one could read ads of this
company selling automobiles and bicycles as if they were from the same “family” of
vehicles, almost if the ads were one, as we can observe in image 1 below.

Image 1. Canadian Magazine Advertiser, Vol. 15, no. 1, May 1900 at XXXVI.

It should not be a surprise that cyclists - also known as “wheelmen” - would
become the first automobile enthusiasts. Only in the 1930s, when automobiles sales
outpaced bicycles sales for the first time in the United States, did bicycles start to be
6

related to lower economic classes. The initial history of the bicycle is remarkably elitist,
metropolitan, militarist, sexist and racist. The bicycle clubs took years before
accepting women and black members.6 Bicycles were toys of the elite, especially
white men that used them to show strength and “masculinity.” It was perceived not
only as a revolutionary and libertarian transportation but also as a symbol of a rich,
adventurous, free and healthy life, just like the automobile would be seen decades
later. By reason of bicycles, for the first time, people were travelling the road for
pleasure.7
For the majority of society, however, just like the motorists a few years later,
the first cyclists were seen as dangerous and egocentric men that would cross the
roads with no care for whoever was in their way, causing accidents and confusion.

1.2 – Paving the way to a motor society - the good roads movement
Although the bicycle industry began in France in the 1860s, it became
widespread only around the mid-1880s, especially in North America and Great
Britain, with the introduction of a more affordable, modern geared and safer model. 8
In Canada, the first bicycle club was formed in 1876 in Montreal. In September of
1882 in Ontario, to protect cyclists’ rights and organize championships, The Canadian

Ibid at 3.
James J Flink, The Automobile Age. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) at 4.
8
Ibid.
6
7

7

Wheelmen’s Association (CWA) was formed,9 and one year later, the first volume of
its magazine was published10 (image 2). In the United States, the League of American
Wheelmen (LAW) was organized in 1880. In France and Great Britain, many
magazines for cyclists were in circulation. Some, like the French Le Vélo, founded in
1891, were published daily.11

Image 2. The Canadian Wheelman Magazine, Vol. 1, nº 1, September 1883.

Kenneth V Smith, “Competitive Cycling in Canada”, (2012), online: Canadian Encyclopedia
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/cycling>.
10
The Canandian Wheelmen’s Association, “The Canadian wheelman” (1883) 1:1 Can Wheel Mag.
11
Flink, supra note 7.
9

8

The motor companies have much to thank those leagues, associations and
their magazines. Much of their efforts and objectives directly helped to turn the
automobile into a real transport alternative at the beginning of the century.
Horse-drawn traffic did not need smooth surfaces, and although there were
techniques for better constructions since the beginning of the nineteenth century,
the competition with the steam locomotive delayed interest in better roads until the
“bicycle craze” of the 1880s and 1890s.12 In that century, many country roads “were
rutted in winter, dust-bowls in the summer and churned with deep mud at most
other times. Urban areas fared better, with macadam roads capped with layers of
dust-bound crushed stone. Major thoroughfares in cities were often topped not with
setts – don’t call ‘em cobbles – but with wood.”13 In the 1880s, cyclists started to
promote highway reforms, culminating in the Good Roads movement.
The lobby of Britain’s Roads Improvement Association, created by cyclists,
served as inspiration for the Good Roads movement in North America.14 The League
of American Wheelmen (LAW) had as one of its primary goals “the improvement of
public roads and highways.”15 The leading bicycles manufacturer in the U.S, Colonel
Albert Pope was one of the most prominent leaders of the movement and helped
found the LAW Good Roads Magazine. The lobby made by the League resulted in
the creation of the Office of the Road Inquiry in 1893, that then became the Office of

Ibid at 3-4.
Reid, supra note 2 at 1.
14
Ibid at 2.
15
Flink, supra note 7.
12
13

9

Public Roads.16 With magazines and associations created with the purpose of
spreading the idea of the movement, this topic became a constant feature in the
newspapers of North America.
Proposing that, for economic matters, farmers should take the lead of the
movement for the improvement of the roads in Canada, two articles under the “The
Road Question” from The Western Advertiser, in January 27th of 1893, make explicit
the leadership of the Canadian Wheelmen’s Association and the connection with the
American movement influencing the debates in Canada. Interestingly, in just a few
words – and probably inadvertently, and without even mentioning automobiles – the
articles anticipated the influence that the horseless carriages would have a few years
later over rural life, and suburbanization. They also punctuated how the competition
with the railroads undermined the condition of the roads. One article, noted:
Mention is frequently made in the columns of the daily press commending
the Wheelmen’s Association for having forced the road question upon the
public in a way to result, possibly, in great good. But this matter of good
roads should not be left to bicycles riders, who of course, are somewhat
interested. It should be a farmer’s movement, for they are the class most
interested. If they produce crops, those crops must be sent to market from
the farms. Manufacturers, merchants and mechanics can, and do
congregate about the railroad stations or points of water transportation,
and to them the matter of roads is a secondary consideration. 17

Also, in the other article titled “The Good Roads Movement”18:
The speakers at the Iowa convention have emphasized the necessity of a
radical change. […] Another [speaker] showed how freedom of social
intercourse over good roads improves the individual and the community,
helps to enliven the social life, and thereby ‘arrests the regrettable tendency
Ibid at 5.
“The Farmers Are More Interested Than Are Bicycle Riders”, West Advert (1893) 6.
18
“The Good Roads Movement”, West Advert (1893) 6.
16
17

10

of many people to rush to the cities.’ And he said that if life was made bright
on the farm there would be fewer inmates of insane asylums, which
doubtless is true.

The New Brunswick Good Roads Association, in the report of its convention
of 1897, also informs about the influence of the American movement. It stated that
“since the agitation for better roads commenced in the United States some years ago
a vast fund of information had been gathered from all sources, and this information
was available to us,”19 and one of its members suggested distributing a pamphlet
with positive arguments for good roads published by the League of American
Wheelmen.
In the Hamilton Evening Times from March 5th of 1896, an article detailing
debates and speeches during the annual meeting and banquet of the Hamilton
Bicycle Club gives another example of the leadership of cyclists in the Good Roads
movement:
The bicycle is no longer a toy, but a means of getting around in business,
and that must be its ultimate purpose. The C.W.A. must, he [a member of
Hamilton Bicycle Club] said, keep its grip on the wheelmen, however, and
agitate for good roads. The farmers of today in many places oppose the
good roads movement, considering it something that the wheelmen are
trying to shove down their throats, but the boys on the farms will soon ride
wheels; in a few years they will be voters; then good roads will be assured.
(Applause).20

Despite some conclusions we may have from that speech, farmers were not
blind to the poor quality of the roads. As stated by The New York Times on

Good Roads Convention for the Province of New Brunswick (1897 : Saint John, N.B.) (Saint John, 1897)
at 60.
20
“The H.B.C. Fully Organized With a Very Strong Executive - The Annual Banquet a Success in Every
Way” (1896) Hamilt Times 5.
19
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November 13th of 1892: “The great majority of the farmers of the United States never
saw a good road and do not know what it is. […] A road that is a morass in Spring, a
Sahara in Summer, a series of ruts and ridges frozen stuff in later Autumn, and a
slough whenever there is a thaw in Winter is to them the normal means of rural
communication.”21 They worried about the costs of the improvement demanded by
the wheelmen. That was the main reason for their opposition. Since products of farms
were transported by horse-drawn vehicles, which did not need smooth and hard
roads; they did not wish to support a movement that could mean increasing taxes
and that, in their understanding, farmers were not the real beneficiaries. Besides that,
farmers themselves did the local roads maintenance, which was far from the ideal,
but at least they were in charge of the costs and the work.22 They did not trust paying
for a centralized system, which was required for large scale improvements. The
urban-elitist aspect of cycling also played a role in their suspiciousness about the
wheelmen intentions: “farmers most certainly mistrusted the ‘peacocks’ on their
bicycles, riding out from cities and lecturing country people on what was good for
them.”23
In disregard of the hope of that speaker in the Hamilton Bicycle Club about
young future farmers becoming cyclists and adhering to their cause, in fact, farmers
became one of the first occupations to use cars. They became motorists and only

Reid, supra note 2 at 5.
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
21

22
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then started to support the movement. As will be seen in the next section, the
automobile was greatly responsible for their support. That does not take, of course,
the credit from wheelmen – for better and worse – for the beginning of the huge
transformation in the cities and the country. As the New York Tribune, cited by
Carlton Reid, said in 1900, when there were already thousands of cars on the streets:
“the part which the bicycle has taken in the promotion of highway improvement is
acknowledged to be important. Perhaps it might not be an exaggeration to say that
the influence exerted by wheelmen in support of that work has been stronger than
that proceeding from any other source.”24

1.3 – Beyond good roads
The Good Roads Movement was not the only impact cyclists had on society.
Bicyclists pushed for key innovations in “mass production, repair shops, road building,
traffic laws, and legal precedents.”25 These transformations impacted society
economically, technologically and legally, creating central features that paved car’s
dominance beyond the physical infrastructure. The development of mass marketing,
the modernization of the labour process, the vertical integration of production, the
creation of machines with interchangeable parts, and the construction of mass
markets for transportation technologies, all crucial for the development of the auto

Ibid.
Zack Furness, One less car: bicycling and the politics of automobility (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2010).
24
25

13

industry, were influenced or created by the bicycle industry, especially by ideas of
Colonel Albert Pope for his factories.26
About the impact of the bicycle industry and the cyclists' movements to
motoring’s rise, Carlton Reid declares that:
Without cycles and cyclists, motoring would have evolved very differently,
and perhaps in a far inferior form. Cyclists became the first and staunchest
evangelisers of motoring because they had been the first to awaken to the
possibilities afforded by self-determined mobility – free from fodder, free
from timetables, free from rails. And, as they were intimately aware of the
benefits that came from the provision of smoother surfaces upon which to
glide, pushy Victorian cyclists agitated for highway reforms. 27

Furness argues that the legacy of the bicycle’s origin was “the construction
of a mobile subjectivity, the development of an entire meaning system around
personal mobility, and the disciplining of bodies and the environment in service of
autonomous mobility.”28 The author tries to not simply validate the popular vision of
the bicycle as a “freedom machine,” arguing that there was a constant tension
between the emancipatory potential of the bicycle and its simultaneous use in the
construction of a “consumerist, individualist, and disciplinary paradigm of mobility.”29
Although technological innovation and falling prices played a role in
increased sales during the 1890s, there was an obvious correlation with the increase
in expenditures on advertisement in that decade.30 The advertisements, however, in
opposition to what was common at that time, did not focus on the use of the bicycle

Ibid.
Reid, supra note 2.
28
Furness, supra note 25 at 17.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
26
27

14

nor its innovative technology. The advertisements sold the image of the cyclist,
creating a system of meaning around the bicycle. The subject of many ads was not
really the vehicle and its functionality, but the consumer itself: the cyclist was the
subject of consumption. Of course, there were still many ads in the traditional format,
trying to convince through logical arguments about the utility and technical aspects
of the product, but many companies, including the most successful ones, adhered to
an alternative and new aesthetic of advertisement. With the use of skilled artists to
construct visual narratives, the companies made images and emotion, not texts and
reason, the central appeal for the consumption of bicycles. Relating bicycles to visual
symbols of astronomy and astrology; wings and sky; sexualized women images and
goddesses; ads tried (with success) to make bicycles the symbol of elevation,
freedom, and desire.31
With this use of emotion and meaning by advertisers, the act of
consumption itself was included in the practice of cycling. That opened the possibility
to create a wide range of products not related to the act of cycling itself but with the
aura of cycling and with the identity of cyclists.32 To be a wheelman had the
significance of being a person of the modern era, a participant of a modern culture.
To gain this identity, however, it was not sufficient to simply own a bicycle but also a
range of accessories and specific outfits.

31
32

Ibid at 17-18.
Ibid at 18-19.
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1.4 – The rise of the “horseless carriage”
Cars are an antique dream. It dates from the 13th-century predictions of the
philosopher Roger Bacon about its possibility. Some drawings by Leonardo da Vinci
and Albrecht Dürer, during the Renaissance, are interpreted as prototypes of the
motor cars.33 There are some reports about the creation, in China, of a self-propelled
vehicle around 1665 by two French Jesuit missionaries, but it was only during the last
half of the 18th century and the very beginning of the 19th century, that governments,
moved by militaristic purposes, and private individuals started to subsidize some
projects and experiments with steam-powered vehicles.34 Nonetheless these first
projects did not succeed in creating a road vehicle more reliable and affordable than
horse-drawn vehicles; they served as a demonstration of what was yet to come. 35
Beside the fact that before the last century roads were horrible for selfpropelled vehicles, the enterprise in the pursuit for a vehicle to long distance travels
on roads had the uneasy task of creating something able to compete not only with
horses, but with railroads that were, in the 19th century, a much cheaper mode of
transport for long travels, and had a far superior technology. Within that competition,
there was the lobby of the horse-drawn carriages and railroad companies that

Brian Ladd, Autophobia: love and hate in the automotive age (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2008) 14.
34
Flink, supra note 7 at 1.
35
Ibid at 2.
33
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influenced the creation of legislation limiting the use of steam road vehicles like, for
example, the Locomotive Act that the English Parliament passed in 1865.36
The Locomotive Act – also known as “The Red Flag Act – influenced greatly
against the automotive idea in England. It limited the speed of the self-propelled
road vehicles to 2 mph (3.2 km/h) in towns, and to 4 mph (6.4 km/h) on open
highways. The most impressive - even picturesque – aspect of this act, though, was
its requirement that someone waving a red flag (or carrying a red light during the
night) should be walking about 5 meters ahead of the vehicle so the citizens could
be aware of the “dangerous machine” that was passing.37
Despite the lobby of companies that saw the development of self-propelled
road vehicles as a threat to their business, during the nineteenth century, the
evolution of a modern urban-industrial social order in Western Europe and North
America made the chase for such a vehicle a multinational quest.38

In many

countries, especially France and the United States, inventors were at the same time
trying to succeed in the automotive project. Because so many experiments and
inventions were in testing in the same period, there is no conclusion about who and
when the automobile was invented.39

Ibid.
Kenneth R Schneider, Autokind vs. Mankind, first ed (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1971)
at 32.
38
Flink, supra note 7.
39
Cotten Seiler, Republic of Drivers: a cultural history of automobility in America (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 2008) at 16.
36
37
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Carlton Reid says that some praise Carl Benz as the father of the modern
motor car.40 With parts bought from Germany’s most prominent bicycle shop, Benz’s
Patent-Motorwagen, from 1886, was in fact, not a “horseless carriage,” but a tricycle
with a motor attached. Some, however, claim that Siegfried Marcus, an Austrian
engineer had a working gasoline automobile at least ten years before Benz’s
invention.41 Marcus, though, for being Jewish, had his name erased from history by
the Nazi government. The Nazis, on exalting Benz as the creator of modern
motoring, also erased the obvious and direct connection of his invention with the
bicycle. In the 1930s, the bicycle had lost its elite and progressive aura; it became a
vehicle for the poor and the face of the past century. These characteristics, for the
Nazis, should not be linked with the machine that symbolized a new modern era. 42
Independently of when and by whom the automobile was invented, the fact
is that only in the last decade of the 19th century, with the creation of the combustion
motor, the “horseless carriage” came out of the inventor's circles and began to be
more widely commercialized and occupy the streets and highways.
On December 19th of 1895, a small note in the Ontarian newspaper The
Glencoe Transcript claimed that “the horseless carriage is now a reality, although it
has not yet reached the state of perfection which it is hoped it will attain within the
next year or two.” It also announced that “before the end of the century the horses
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will cease to be used for locomotion purposes.”43 Between 1895 and 1896, other
Ontarian newspapers, like The London Advertiser and Watford Guide-Advocate, gave
attention to “horseless carriages contests”44 and announced that within one or two
years they should have the “perfect machine.”45 On June 18th of 1896, The Glencoe
Transcript also announced that:
the bicycle fever will not have spent its fury before another craze has
developed and taken hold of the community. The horseless vehicle is the
coming sensation. […] It is predicted that the fever will be due in this country
in two years and that before five years have elapsed every city will be turned
into a veritable pandemonium of wheels [bicycles] and automobiles. The
horse will soon become a memory of the past and the street car’s days seem
to be numbered too.46

Indeed, by 1900, although horses were still in heavy use, the number of
registered automobiles in the United States was already eight thousand; by 1910,
458.500, and by 1929, the number had jumped to 23.1 million. By 1913, the
automobile outproduced buggies and wagons.47 By 1922, “some 135,000 suburban
homes in 60 cities were already wholly dependent on automobile transportation.”48
Canada, by January of 1925, was the third country in number of registered
automobiles - 636,489 - outnumbered only by the United States and Great Britain.49
A survey from 1927 showed that 55.7% of the American families owned at least one
automobile, and the industry statistics show that, at that same year, for the first time,
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there were more sales of new automobiles for replacement demand than for first
time owners.50
What was the reason for that growth in the first decades? For some, posing
this question in 2019 may sound naive. After all, for most contemporary citizens, the
superiority of cars is obvious. Yet, this alleged superiority was not that obvious for
most people in the late 1800s. For the masses, what was evident was the link between
cars, deaths and chaos.

1.5 – The utility thesis
From the beginning of the 1920s to the 1940s, there was a transition in the
perception of the general population about the importance, necessity and symbolic
value of the automobile. This move includes the transference of the responsibility for
injuries and deaths from motorists to pedestrians. In the words of Schneider: “Ever
so subtly Americans ceased to judge the motor car, and the motor car began to
judge America.”51
For some historians, this was a natural consequence of the battle between
different technologies, the best one winning; for others, it was a construction of social
actors, pushing society to a path that suited their interests.
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The main reason most historical researchers put for that evolution of motor
car sales during the 1910s and 1920s was the increasing knowledge of the utility of
the automobile in the context of work52 - making the transport of people and goods
easier – allied to the efficient production and falling prices since 1906, and specially
with the introduction of the low-priced Ford Model T in 1908, produced in Windsor
(Canada) and Detroit (United States).53
One of the arguments commonly used by the proponents of this utility
thesis54 is that the early adoption of automobiles by doctors and farmers - two
professional categories usually associated with work and practicality - helped to
weaken the early popular condemnation of automobiles and to spread the vision of
the motor vehicle as a machinery useful for the context of work. Moreover, the wide
adoption of motor vehicles by farmers visibly broke the isolation of the rural life,
made easier the farm labour and reduced enormously the cost of products
transportation, resulting in more profit for the producers and lower prices for the
consumers in the cities.55
One of the most critical writers on the motor-centred society, Kenneth
Schneider summarizes:
[…] doctors found the car superb on missions of mercy. San Francisco
discovered in 1906 that, unlike the horse, the automobile never tired during
the emergency of the Great Fire. Men then began to realize that it could
work for them. After 1910 the farmer was awed to find he could get to town
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in fifteen minutes instead of an hour and a half. But when the city man
concluded that the Colt Runabout he used for Sunday outings was wasting
away when it might just as well carry him to the office, the automobile was
in.56

As explained in the previous section of this work, the automobile had the
opposition of many groups. On the other hand, it also had many enthusiasts,
inventors and manufacturers praising the new machine as responsible for many
potential benefits for society and individuals. Like bicycles in the late 19th century,
cars were held by enthusiasts as responsible for the promotion of healthier social
relationships and well-balanced life, the break down of the class distinctions and even
the strengthen of the character. The automobile was, for some, the cure for the
problems of modern life.57
Cities in North America from the turn of the nineteenth century were not as
idyllic as many like to imagine. For thousands of urban citizens, “modern life” brought
by the Industrial Revolution meant living in crowded slums with lack of sanitation and
privacy.58 In addition to that, try to imagine living in a city where you would smell
manure almost all the time you were outdoors and could step over horses’ waste
almost in every street you would walk. Imagine during the rainy seasons those
excrements turning into a syrupy mass entering homes. 59 That unpleasant scenario
was true in major cities. It is estimated that around 1,135 tons of manure and 227,125
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litres of urine were deposited by horses on the streets of New York City each day.60
Especially in the urban context, where the great number of people gathered is the
perfect environment to boost the spread of diseases, that image gives a good sight
of how horses were related to many health public problems. Flies used the manure
- always present on the streets - to breed and could carry more than thirty diseases.
Typhoid fever, tetanus, diarrhea - one of the main health problems of children of
that time - and other diseases were connected to the horse population in the cities.61
In addition to all that, it was common to have carcasses of horses on the streets. It is
estimated that about 15,000 dead horses were removed from the streets of New York
every year.62
The automobile appeared for some groups as a “clean” alternative and
could be a way out of that dirty environment. That may sound odd for us as we are
about to face a climate change calamity, caused in great part by car dependence.
The emphasis in the publicity pieces of the quality and the practical benefits
of the motor vehicle are used as an argument that cars were bought not because of
their invisible enchantments, but because of their practical use.63 In opposition to this
argument, some say that, actually, the industry was willing to take the fear off of the
popular imaginary and to turn automobiles into mundane useful objects, into
something that could be used routinely. That was the explanation for the effort to
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demonstrate its quality, safety and facility.64 There was no need to demonstrate the
excitement, the thrill or the adventurous nature of the automobile since those
emotions were evident and “had been established during its earliest years by a
myriad of literary and visual artists, journalists, philosophers and commentators.”65
These sources, however, usually described this thrill in the form of accidents, lack of
safety and poor performance.

1.6 – From “king of the killers” to “king of the roads”: the construction of the jaywalker
Writing about court decisions from the nineteenth century involving cyclists,
Waters demonstrates that, “as is the case today, cycling was a contested activity.”66
The rise of the bicycle and the wheelmen did not come without incompatibilities with
the current social order. Transgressions and disagreements could be evident with the
“macho” aspect embedded in some cyclists’ practices like “scorching,”67 a way to
show masculinity and “status by riding fast and recklessly.”68 Conflicts between
cyclists and other street or sidewalk users were common and “disputes sometimes
ended up in injury or court or both.”69
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As disruptive as the bicycle was — and still can be — the changes and
conflicts it caused during that time were in no way comparable to the ways the
automobile’s emergence destabilized the dominant social constructions of the street.
Cars were uninvited guests, unwelcome and incompatible with old street uses. 70
Children commonly played on the streets, and pedestrians could walk anywhere they
wanted. The most dangerous vehicles in the cities were bicycles and streetcars.
Despite a few changes in the view about the streets with the advent of the bicycle,
the use of this public space was still stable and similar to the use it had for centuries:
it was a space for meetings and walking.71 With automobiles, the street became visibly
a terrain of dispute.72
The most significant change that came with the arrival of automobiles was
the rise of deaths on roads to levels never seen before. Children were the main
victims. As the number of cars increased, pedestrians could not walk as safely as
before. In Berlin, during 1906 and 1907, more than 90% of the two thousand cars
registered were involved in collisions in which often the victims were pedestrians.73
This reality brought by the presence of the new machine, made groups of the North
America society initiate movements against it.74 Sometimes, the streets became
almost literally battle fields, with angry pedestrians creating riots and throwing rocks
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against motorists and their machines, specially when a pedestrian was killed or
injured.75
Peter Norton affirms that there were several distinct, but relevant, social
groups that were concerned with changes and fatalities brought by the automobile.
Parents and authorities were astonished by the rise of deaths and injuries caused by
automobiles. Business owners worried about the chaos in the streets. Legislators and
judges were troubled by the lack of control over the new machine. Some could not
stand the noise and disturbance.76 Although these groups had different concerns
and interests, the consequences of the increasing number of automobiles tended to
make them more cohesive in the fight against “motor doom,” trying to preserve the
streets they knew.77
Until the 1920s, in case of an injury or death involving a pedestrian and an
automobile, the prevailing public opinion was to blame the motorist entirely. It was
not in question whether the pedestrian had or not the right to be on the street.
Automobiles, on the opposite, were constantly questioned over their right to the
street, and were even legally banished from roads.
In Marin County, California, for example, a motorist was imprisoned for
driving after the sunset, which was prohibited. The Supreme Court of California
denied Habeas Corpus, deciding his imprisonment was reasonable. The court,
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however, stated that “if the use of automobiles gradually becomes more common,
there may come a time an ordinance like the one in question would be
unreasonable.”78
Cars were not seen as a necessity, but simply as a toy for their owner’s
pleasure. Also, they were believed to be inherently dangerous. Since walking was an
obvious necessity and pedestrians could not cause injury or deaths on roads,
accidents were was self-evidently the complete responsibility of motorists.79
That vision about cars and motorists could be seen in many newspapers and
artworks from the first decades of the last century. For example, the painting “And
The Prize is Death,” by Albert Levering, from 1910, shows a gloomy representation of
Hermes carrying a trophy made of a skull leading motor racers through a path of
destruction (Image 3). One cover of the New York Times from 1924 reports the
national concern on the increase of motor killing, depicting the image of motorists
as Death itself speeding over children (Image 4). The Toronto Telegram, from 1934,
gives to the automobile the title of “king of the killers” among calamities like war and
fire, stating that cars are “the greatest menace to human life.” The image in the
newspaper shows a reckless motorist in high speed, careless about children and
leaving a trail of dead pedestrians behind (Image 5).
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What was the reason, then, for a shift in the popular opinion about cars and
the causes of the deaths on the streets? There are a few explanations that will be
developed below.
Besides the organized groups battling against the automobile, believing and
demonstrating that it was far from being the most efficient and safe means of
transportation, during the 1920s, the economy was recovering from the recession of
1921. Automobile sales continued to fall, having a slump in 1923.80 The motor
companies were alarmed with the possibility of a market saturation. Industry insiders
considered that soon the demand for cars would get to its limit.
The industry became aware that changing the perception about its product
was an urgent task. Simply announcing its utility was not sufficient to battle the
justifiable fear and to reach a larger market share: the city was not yet designed for
cars, and daily reports of deaths and severe injuries made very clear that it was not
a safe vehicle. Logic was against the use of automobiles. Cars were not so useful and
efficient to the point to become a real necessity to the overall urban population and
to be prioritized by the authorities. The manufacturers needed a better plan.
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1.7 – The shift
In 1927, the banker Paul Mazur said that “we must shift America from a
needs- to a desire-culture. People must be trained to desire, to want new things,
even before the old have been entirely consumed. Man’s desires must overshadow
his needs.”81 New public relations techniques were the perfect match to help to make
this shift and transform citizenship into the synonym of consumerism.
During the First World War, the American government hired Edward Bernays
– the “father of public relations”82 – to make war propaganda domestically and
abroad. For his task, Bernays used the theories of his uncle - Sigmund Freud - to
shape public opinion. For the first time, psychoanalysis theories were applied for a
mass of people instead of only one individual in a clinical situation.83 The view of
masses as inherently irrational and desire-driven was at the core of Bernays’ strategy.
His propaganda campaign was tremendously successful. He believed he could apply
the same techniques in times of peace to promote democracy, peace and products.
For this, after the war, he created an agency - the first public relations agency.84
Until the 1920s, the motor industry did not have a coordinated national
public relations effort.85 The increasingly bad reputation of their product and
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dropping sales changed this. Automobiles companies like Dort Motor, Dodge
Brothers, and General Motors hired Edward Bernays, and during the 1930’s, he was
also hired by the Automobile Manufacturers Association.86 At the same time, the
National Automobile Chamber of Commerce (NACC) and the American Automobile
Association also hired public relations professionals.87
Under the direction of those professionals, the industry changed profoundly
the way they sold its product. Instead of rational persuasion, the advertisements
appealed to the subconscious and primitive desires. To provoke the irrational
behaviour of acquiring an automobile by whom it was not needed or a new one by
who had a still perfectly usable version, they had to link it to a major value of the
society. This value could be used as a trigger to consumerism and affection for the
product and the companies’ brands. That could save the industry from the public
backlash and dropping sales. With this objective, the automobile started to be
announced as the symbol of one of the core values of North America: freedom.88
This was not entirely new. As we saw in a previous section, by the 1890’s,
bicycle manufacturers innovated in this direction. Because of the scientific and
sociological aspects, however, modern techniques of public relations were much
more sophisticated and effective. And there was one new important and powerful
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component: the deliberate manipulation through the media and personalities trusted
by the targeted public.
Bernays wrote that:
People accept the facts which come to them through existing channels.
They like to hear new things in accustomed ways. They have neither the
time nor the inclination to search for facts that are not readily available to
them. The expert, therefore, must advise first upon the form of action
desirable for his client and secondly must utilize the established mediums
of communication, in order to present to the public a point of view. This is
true whether it is that of a majority or minority, old or new personality,
institution or group which desires to change by modification or
intensification the store of knowledge and the opinion of the public.89

To reach their goals, car producers knew the stories told in the newspapers
about automobiles had to change. Using that Bernays’ premise, NACC subverted the
prevailing way newspapers used to tell the stories of traffic safety, switching the
responsibility from drivers to pedestrians. To make this change happen, NACC
offered to newspapers a service to “help” them in their work of reporting traffic
accidents. NACC would give blank forms to newspaper editors whom would fill it
with the accidents details. NACC would provide the editors with their own experts’
interpretation of the data and conclusions about the causes of the accidents.90 Within
one year, newspapers in more than 300 cities were filling these forms and using
NACC’s conclusions as the basis for their reports.
Pedestrians, once reported as victims, were transformed into the ones to
blame for their own deaths and injuries. Parents started to be labeled as irresponsible
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for letting their children play on the streets. Under that new traffic safety logic, the
solution to reduce deaths and injuries was to spread a clear message: streets are for
cars, pedestrians must not jaywalk, and children must not play on streets.
Although the term jaywalker was in use since 1913, only with the public
relations efforts of the auto industry during the mid-1920’s did it became widely
known and used.91 Those efforts were not reduced to the reports. Massive “safety”
campaigns were created to “educate” the population about their responsibilities as
parents and pedestrians, and the risks of jaywalking and playing on the streets.
Following Bernays’ techniques, those campaigns used movie stars, radio celebrities,
and known experts to give the necessary credibility. In 1929, the Canadian
Automobile Association launched in Ontario its School Safety Patrols program. AAA
also had its own program, and throughout North America, local auto clubs created
and sponsored school safety patrols, promoting educational safety campaigns.
Children learned that streets are not for playing or walking. They are for cars.
As a demonstration of the novelty that the word “jaywalker” was in the 1910s,
we have the following words in a speech during a meeting of the Central Railway
and Engineering Club of Canada held in 1914:
I want to acquaint the members with a new term which has been coined
and introduced in Houston, Texas, and some of the other cities in the States,
as applicable to people walking across a crowded thoroughfare between
the regular crossings without observing where they are going or what is
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coming. The term is “jaywalking.” This is, of course, in connection with Safety
First. Nobody wants to be a ‘jaywalker.’92

Two years later, the London Advertiser reported the complaint of a “wellknown automobile man” about the lack of attention Canadian society was giving to
the dangerous “habit of jaywalking”:
In most of the European cities the pedestrian ‘jay walker’ would be arrested
and fined, and should the temerity lead to the breaking of his bones he
would be fined just the same, and if killed, death would close the incident.
[…] The persons afoot need to be controlled, […] and the largest number of
children killed and injured ranged in age from two to eight years. If the
parents and children were taught to exercise the same caution as
automobile drivers are expected to use, I firmly believe that in time the
number of accidents in all of our larger cities will be reduced to a
minimum.93

In November of 1922, under the title “Jay-Walking Greatest Menace to
Safety”, the Ontarian newspaper The Free Press reported an interview with the
executive chairman of the AAA, in which he argues, using statistics of the causes of
accidents in New York, that the drivers are not the ones to blame in the majority of
the cases, and that it is necessary to legislate penalties for jaywalking. In his words:
The first cry that goes up, as a rule, when such an accident occurs, is that
the driver of the car was at fault when, as a matter of fact, in a large majority
of the cases the person injured was to blame. […] These figures serve to
emphasize the contention of the A. A. A. That no traffic regulation is
complete until it provides a penalty for jay-walking. The jay-walker in my
opinion is the most serious menace to traffic safety in the United States today. […] we feel that if a motorist is to be fined for disobedience of a traffic
signal, then the pedestrian should be fined for jay-walking across the street,
putting himself, as well as every motorist […], in danger. […] The automobile
driver is entitled to much more consideration than he now receives.94
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Almost a year later, The Free Press reported Los Angeles had tested a
jaywalker ban, placing signs warning jaywalking was prohibited.95
Imprisonment of jaywalkers could raise the risk of judges using commonlaw precedents to question the legality of pedestrian control. Aware of that, the
Automobile Club of Southern California and authorities of Los Angeles preferred to
not take a hard approach. Instead, they made a massive “education” campaign in
the days before the enforcement of the new rules against jaywalkers using printed
publicity and every radio station. The objective was to create a “motor-minded”
population, and, therefore, easier to accept the pedestrian control. The idea was to
create a ridicule the image of the jaywalker. The public embarrassment caused by a
whistle and a pointed finger of the police was more affective than fines, and less likely
to be questioned before a judge. As a member of the auto club said: “The ridicule of
their fellow citizens is far more effective than any other means which might be
adopted.”96
That kind of strategy and the Los Angeles’ city traffic code created the basis
for reconstructing traffic safety in favour of automobile and drivers. It was replicated
through North America and set the support for cities planned for cars.
Before those campaigns and laws against jaywalking, the rights of
pedestrians to be on the road were self-evident. In 1906, Xenophon Huddy, even
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though arguing in favor of drivers’ right to the road, did not argue against
pedestrians’ rights to the same space. He wrote in his book The Law of Automobile
that “primarily the general purpose of streets and highways is that of travel either on
foot by a pedestrian or in a vehicle propelled by power. […] The rights of footmen
and drivers in the highway are equal and both must exercise such care as
circumstances demand.”97
Contributory negligence was a powerful reason for pedestrians to not
litigate against drivers.98 During this era, “In an action by a pedestrian to recover
damages for an injury from an automobile, there [could] be, as a general proposition,
no recovery unless the plaintiff was free from negligence which contributed to the
injury.”99
In relation to responsibility and contributory negligence of parents, in a case
involving the death of a six year old boy, the N.Y. Supreme Court decided the parent
(plaintiff) should prove they had no contributory absence.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-BURDEN OF PROOF-AUTOMOBILES.THIES V. THOMAS, 77 N. Y. SUPP. 276. - A boy of six, while playing between
blocks, was run over by an automobile and killed. In an action by
administrator, held, that the burden of proof, to show absence of
contributory negligence, was on plaintiff.100
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Xenophon Huddy uses that case to explain the rights in cases of children
harmed in automobile collisions:
the fact that a six-year-old boy, run over by a motor car, is found in the
street, and played on the street, is not per se negligence on the part of his
parents, but whether his parents were negligent is a question for the jury.
[…] the death of a boy run over by a motor car, the fact that the accident
did not happen at a street crossing, but at a point between blocks, may be
considered by the jury on the issue of negligence. […] In an action to recover
for the death of a six-year-old boy, it is a question for the jury whether his
playing on the street was contributory negligence.101

A similar case in 1945 in the Ontario Court of Appeal, but involving a
motorbus instead of an automobile, gives a glimpse over the understanding of the
rights of pedestrians on that time, after years of campaigns against jaywalking. The
appellants were the father and mother of a nine year old boy that was killed by a
motorbus while crossing the street running. The trial jury decided that the boy had
been negligent for “running across the street between intersections, and not looking
both ways for oncoming traffic.”102 They also decided “the driver and Public Utilities
Commission are in no way responsible, but we are agreed that the City of Kitchener
is lax with regard to the enforcement of the parking laws pertaining to the east side
of Queen Street South.”103 The trial Judge later dismissed the action, holding the fault
assigned by the jury to the defendant Corporation was not available.
With two votes against one, the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The
dissenting justice agreed with the thoughts of the majority about the lack of
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importance in the fact the motorbus was faster than it should be and about the rights
of the boy that, even though he had legally the right to cross the street, was
jaywalking. The justice said in his decision:
The learned Judge stated:
"There is no prohibition in law, unfortunately, against a pedestrian crossing
at any place but an intersection. Nobody in authority has made it a law and
therefore legally the boy was entitled to do what he did, but he could not
expect, or a person who `Jaywalks' can not expect to find traffic conditions
as safe going across the street at a place not, an intersection as he can at
intersections which are protected for people who intend to go across the
street.
"Section 39 (2) (e) of the Highway Traffic Act, again, provides that the driver
of a vehicle is permitted to proceed across an intersection or to turn to the
right or left but that such permission shall always be subject to the safety of
pedestrians and other traffic. The law, however, does not make the proviso
in favour of those who are crossing at unauthorized places."
Reading this passage as part of the whole charge, I think a reasonable
construction is that the learned Judge was instructing the jury that it was not
unlawful for the boy to cross in the middle of the block, but when he
undertook to do so he was not subject to the same legal safeguards as when
he crosses at an intersection. In other words, that there was a greater degree
of care required of one who enters the traffic which might reasonably be
expected on the roadway between intersections, than one who crosses at
an intersection.104

Waters asserts that before cars, rules of traffic were dictated mainly by
Common Law. The main subject of jurisprudential debates was the Cycling Law. 105
With the arrival of the automobile, traffic regulation and jurisprudence moved its
attention to the new machine and courts internalized the protection of the
automobile.
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Today there are cases where victims of collisions are blamed, and the driver
is considered not negligent at all.106 Ormiston (Litigation guardian of) v Insurance
Corp. of British Columbia,107 is a recent example of that. In that case, a teenage cyclist
decided to pass a van on the right. The van was stopped in the right line close to the
centre line. The driver, for no apparent reason abruptly accelerated moving to the
right making the cyclist lose balance and fall. The court decided that, even if the
driver had seen the cyclist in the mirror, he had the right to move in that way, because
it was in the vehicle’s lane. The court also decided that the cyclist did a “foolish thing”
and was “the sole author of his misfortune.”108

1.8 – Futurama: a look into the future
By the 1930s, with the idea that “selling cars was less important than a public
relations campaign advocating transformation of the American landscape,” 109 motor
companies engaged more directly with urbanism, promoting, through public
expositions, a vision of a technological future driven by a world connected by large
highways and cities built around motor traffic needs.110 The pinnacle of the success
of those exhibitions was a diorama sponsored by GM and created by the theatre and
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industrial designer Norman Bel Geddes: Futurama, “the most popular exhibit of the
1939-40 New York World's Fair.”111 Until the end of the exposition, that cost the
equivalent of US$ 100 million today,112 more than five million people had seen the
exposition that modeled a utopian United States of 1960 constructed by and for the
automobile. Professor Dolores Hayden describes it:
the model represented many parts of the American landscape —rural,
suburban, and urban — from Yosemite to Saint Louis. The builders worked
with aerial photographs by Sherman Fairchild, who had made a successful
business out of supplying aerial images to developers and planners. The
model included over 35,780 square feet, with mountains, hills, and plains
adorned with a million trees and half a million buildings representing
different kinds of housing, a farm, a steel mill, an amusement park, an
airport, a monastery, a resort, and a dam with hydroelectric plant, as well as
stores and office buildings. The scale varied (from one inch to ten feet, to
one inch to three hundred feet). The skyscrapers were almost as tall as the
workers who hefted them into place.113

Geddes himself in his book Magic Motorways describes what the public
experienced:
As each spectator rode around the model in his comfortable, upholstered
armchair, he listened to a description of it in a voice which came from a
small speaker built into the back of the chair. This recorded description
synchronized with the movement of the chairs and explained the main
features of what was passing before the spectator’s eyes. It directed his
attention to the great arterial highways which were segregated into different
speed lanes and which looked so different from the roads of today. It
pointed out the over-passes, high-speed intersections and wide bridges
over which tear-drop motor cars whisked by at a hundred miles an hour. It
commented in passing on the surrounding scenery, the planned cities,
decentralized communities and experimental farms. But it did not describe
in detail how any of this was to accomplished.
[…] They saw the world of tomorrow lying there invitingly before them – a
world that looked like Utopia and that did not seem to have a very close
relation to the world they knew.114
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Futurama is the most known part of a “large-scale, sustained marketing
campaign by General Motors to promote highway-centric urban reforms directly to
citizens of North America.”115 From 1936 to 1956, roadshows entitled The Parade of
Progress have taken “miniature world’s fair on wheels”116 to more than 20 million
people in more than 250 cities and towns117 across the continent.118 The mission of the
campaign was to capture the imagination with sensational demonstrations of a
futuristic view of “automotive functionality for towns and cities.”119
Hayden uses anthropologist Setha Low’s theory of “embodied space” to
suggest the whole experience in Futurama – from the fatigue of waiting outside in line
to the disorientation through sounds, lights and infrastructure inside – intended to
embed Geddes’ landscape vision for the future in the minds and bodies of Futurama’s
visitors. She also argues that through souvenirs, like postcards mailed by the visitors
to relatives or friends, allied to radio and news coverage, the fair was expended to
minds and bodies of those who could not be physically present, paving way to a
national program of highways and modifications in the legislation in the next decade.
Via geographic analysis, Hayden also claims that Geddes created an inevitable
and uncontested view for the future. In his vision and images, he refused any inequity
and exclusions of race, gender, age or disabilities that were – and still are in many
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cases – related to a society of consumerism and an infrastructure dedicated to cars
and speed.
Geographers often argue that landscape has the power to make seem
inevitable what is really contested. Geddes was careful to construct a model
of landscape with what he defined as “a future which retains enough of 1939
to keep it from being fantastic,” while he left out any contestation. In 1939
automobile technology excluded those too old, too young, too poor, or
those unable to see well enough to drive. The majority of Americans who
held drivers’ licenses were white men. Women were often ridiculed as bad
drivers and most cars were bought by men. The small minority of African
Americans who did own cars were discriminated against by segregated gas
stations and motels. Americans knew gritty streets and cluttered arterials,
they drove through slums, on “buyways” (roads lined with billboards), and
through ribbon development (strip malls). They passed tire dumps, auto
graveyards, and hot-dog trails, but Geddes encouraged them to imagine
that by 1960, on a “Magic Motorway,” a man could speed between
skyscrapers with God, progress, and government on his side. 120

Citing ideas of Stuart Rockefeller, Setha Low wrote that places exist
“simultaneously in the land, people’s minds, customs, and bodily practices.”121 Through
campaigns against jaywalking and with exhibitions like Futurama and The Parade of
Progress, the construction of the automobile era was created not only in and through
the physical structure of the cities, but in the minds, the customs and the bodies of the
masses and authorities. In this interconnection of influences between physical space
and space created in the mind, is present the shift of the legal and judicial paradigm
influencing and being influenced by the infrastructure and the perceived roles of the
bodies inside that special configuration. While being modeled by that construction,
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courts and lawmakers also modeled the new roles for pedestrians, cyclists and drivers,
mutating the practices on the streets, the perceptions and beliefs about who owns
that space.
The legal geographer Milton Santos, in his book The Nature of Space – while
discussing about the relation between space, objects and action – cites some thoughts
of Jean Baudrillard that may summarize the influence of the aspects posed in this
section and throughout the chapter:
The automobile is, for Baudrillard, one of the most important signs of our
time and its role in the production of the imagination has profound
repercussions on the whole of man's life, including the redefinition of society
and space. Cities would not be what they are today if the automobile did
not exist. Men end up considering the automobile as indispensable and this
psychological data becomes a data of the lived reality. Illusion or certainty,
the automobile strengthens in its owner the idea of freedom of movement,
giving it the feeling of buying time, not wasting a minute, in this century of
speed and hurriedness. With the individual vehicle, man imagines himself
more fully realized, thus responding to the demands of status and
narcissism characteristic of the postmodern era. The automobile is an
element of the wardrobe, a quasi-garment. Used on the street, it seems to
extend the man's body as an extra prosthesis, just as other utensils indoors
are within reach.122 [unofficial translation]
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CHAPTER 2
DRIVERLESS TECHNOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND GOVERNMENT DEBATES
In the first chapter, the discussion was centred in the past and how the
upsurge of two new technologies – the bicycle and the automobile – and the policy
decisions guided by automakers’ advertisements and propaganda influenced the
shaping of our cities and our minds. In this chapter and the next one, the focus will be
on the present with a glimpse into the future.
Glen Hiemstra wrote, in 2000 [and reproduced in the 2007 book Cities and
Cars]123, that “we are at the beginning of the second automobile era,” and that
the shift to environmentally friendly automobiles will keep mass transit
marginal. In a certain sense, we might actually witness the morphing of
autos into quasi-trains. Intelligent, self-driving cars on a guideway, moving
at high speeds and within inches of each other, form a kind of train. But this
train is flexible, private, and personal, all of which Americans prefer. 124

Right now we see the rise of that new technology in transportation described
by many as “disruptive” and probably the greatest transformer of our society for the
next decades.125 It is believed that it will “reshape” the urban environment.126 The
changes expected to happen are on traffic volume, average speed, travel time
reliability, safety, mode mix, congestion, parking, land use, travel cost, emissions,

Glen Hiemstra, “Cars of the Future” in Roger L Kemp, Cities and Cars: a handbook of best practices
(North Carolin: McFarland & Company, 2007).
124
Ibid at 240.
125
National Association of City Transportation Officials, NACTO Policy Statement on Automated Vehicles
(New York, 2016).
126
Toronto Transportation Services Division, “Preparing the City of Toronto for Automated Vehicles”,
(2018), online: City Toronto <https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/8f04-AVs-TSWorkplan.pdf>.
123

44

energy consumption, and other environmental and social effects 127. There is not,
however, a consensus on how, when and which of these changes will really ever
come.128
This second chapter is a presentation of some of today’s views and
expectations about the technology and serves as an introduction to the debate in the
third chapter, where some challenges that may jeopardize some promises and
expectations are discussed. This chapter is divided in seven sections. In the first section,
there is a discussion of what defines robots and if driverless cars may be considered
robots. The second section shows the most used classification for self-driving cars, and
the promises and expectations of the companies. The third and fourth sections present
the governmental approach and debates for the deployment of driverless cars in the
United States and Canada. The fifth section displays some efforts governments and
lawmakers around the world are making in the debate about the liability of the new
technology. A brief discussion of the first fatal crashes and lawsuits involving cars with
some level of automation appears in the sixth section. Finally, in the last section, it is
proposed that framing this new technology as a mere advance of the automobile,
though obvious, may constrain the way we use it and limit our vision for the future
possibilities and consequences of the technology.
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2.1 – Are driverless cars robots?
In 1918, in the section “New and Interesting Facts from Science and Life” of the
Oakland Tribune, a columnist wondered about the future of the technology: “The new
car will be all glass-enclosed and controlled entirely by a set of push buttons. It will
have no clutch, gears or transmission, will sit low, have small clearance and
punctureless tires”129. Geddes, about the future modeled in Futurama, wrote:
These cars of 1960 and the highways on which they drive will have in the
devices which will correct the faults of human beings as drivers. They will
prevent the driver from committing errors. They will prevent his turning out
into traffic except when he should. They will aid him in passing through
intersections without slowing down or causing anyone else to do so and
without endangering himself or others.130

A century after the columnist of Oakland Tribune, in his book Autonomy,
Lawrence Burns also described a new car in a quite similar way:
[…] a ride will happen with the touch of an app. The vehicle that arrives won’t
have a steering wheel or gas and brake pedals. Most trips will happen in
electric vehicles tailored to comfortably seat two people, since most trips we
make happen solo or with just one other person. All this – and
transportation is going to cost us just a fraction of what it ever did before. 131

The idea and desire for driverless cars is not new.132 The difference of Burns’
words to Geddes description of the “cars of 1960” is that never before were those cars
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so close of becoming part of the reality: the technology is already being tested on our
roads.
This technology, however, despite the obvious characteristics that makes it a
car, is something else: it is robotic, and therefore it “blurs the very line between people
and instrument.”133
On defining what is a robot, Professor Ryan Calo wrote:
few complex technologies have a single, stable, uncontested definition.
Robots are no exception. There is some measure of consensus, however,
around the idea that robots are mechanical objects that take the world in,
process what they sense, and in turn act upon the world.
[…] To sum up, robots are best thought of as artificial objects or systems
that sense, process, and act upon the world to at least some degree. […]
What turns out to be important for legal and policy discourse is not the
precise architecture, but the possibilities and experiences the architecture
generates and circumscribes.134

Richards and Smart, in the same sense, say that “move about and manipulate
things in its world [are] two features that we expect of a robot.” 135 But “even
professional roboticists do not have a single clear definition.”136
Calo combines three characteristics to define what is a robot: the capacity to
cause physical harm; emergent behavior; and social valence.
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Calo calls “embodiment” the possibility of causing physical harm. This
characteristic generally requires a physical presence.137 The second characteristic is the
one of not only executing commands, but original action through the robots’
capabilities of processing. Rather than call this “true learning” or “autonomy,” Calo
prefers to call this “emergence,” referring to “unpredictably useful behavior.138 Finally,
because of “a physical embodiment coupled with apparently spontaneous action leads
people to lend robots social valence.”139 They, “more so than other technology in our
lives, […] feel different to us, more like living agents.”140
Balkin, commenting on those three characteristics suggested by Calo, writes:
The first two characteristics of robotics that Calo identified— the capacity to
cause physical harm and emergent behavior—create obvious problems for
assigning liability in tort and criminal law.
[…]
What Calo calls “social valence,” however, is a far more complex
phenomenon. It is not limited to the question of legal liability but concerns
every way that robots and AI agents might intervene in social relations.
[…]
I’ve argued against essentialism in law’s encounter with technology,
advocating instead that we should always keep the social aspects of
technology in mind. Because we innovate in social relations along with
technology, we cannot always tell what will be most important about
technology in the years to come.141

Richard and Smart also propose a working definition of a robot as:
a constructed system that displays both physical and mental agency but is
not alive in the biological sense. That is to say, a robot is something
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manufactured that moves about the world, seems to make rational
decisions about what to do, and is a machine. It is important to note that
the ascription of agency is subjective: the system must only appear to have
agency to an external observer to meet our cri- teria.9 In addition, our
definition excludes wholly software- based artificial intelligences that exert
no agency in the physical world.142 [italic from the original]

By both proposed definitions, we may see self-driving cars as robot-cars. They
are machines that move about the world and seem to make rational decisions, or even
have “original action;”143 they can cause harm, and give us a sense that they are like
“living agents.”144 This definition is important, because, as Balkin said, it creates
concerns in relation to not only liability and criminal law, but also because of new social
relations that may come along with the technology in the coming years. This aspect
will be particularly important for the debates proposed in the third chapter.

2.2 – Levels of autonomy, and deployment predictions
The most used classification for driverless cars comes from a Society of
Automotive Engineers International’s (SAE International) Information Report145 that
provides a taxonomy describing the full range of levels of automation in on-road
motor vehicles. The report specifies six levels of automation ranging from level 0 (no
driving automation) to level 5 (full driving automation). From levels 0 to 3, there is
always the need for steering wheels. In level 4 (high driving automation), depending
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on the use of the car (e.g. if used only in a particular urban area) the steering wheel
may not be required. In the 5th level of automation, the steering wheel is entirely
unnecessary; the car must perform all the tasks in any condition, and in any region of
the world without human intervention. In the highest level of automation, therefore,
there are no drivers, only passengers.
Right now, the technology has not reached the 5th level, and the 4th level is
still in testing. Although many of those tests are currently on real streets and roads,
enabling the industry to collect data and analyze the cars in real environment
situations, there is a lack of certainty of when the industry will be able to deliver 4 th
level cars in large scale.146
Despite that lack of certainty, the industry is constantly announcing
predictions about the deployment of high level of autonomy for the general public.
During the research for this work, for example, in August 2018, Ford Motors Company
announced its objective to produce driverless cars (level 4) in large scale by 2021. 147
On April 2019, though, the company’s CEO – who previously ran the Ford’s
autonomous-driving division – lowered the expectations around this launch, saying
“we overestimated the arrival of autonomous vehicles.”148The company still intends to
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deliver an autonomous car by 2021, but “its applications will be narrow, […] because
the problem is so complex.”149Two months later, in July, Ford announced a partnership
with Volkswagen to achieve that deadline. Using start-up Argo AI’s technology, the
two automakers intend to release a ride-sharing service in a few urban areas.150
Cruise Automation, a company acquired by General Motors in 2016, expected
to launch its ride-hailing service by 2018. Technological issues (see chapter 3),
however, made it delay the service debut to 2019.151 To date, the company had not
offered the service, and in July of 2019 it declined to answer to the New York Times if
they were still pursuing that deadline to start a ride service in “at scale” 152 this year.
Elon Musk, the chief executive of Tesla Company, during a Tesla event in April
2019,153 showed a video of a Tesla car, in a non-heavily urban environment, driving in
autonomous mode all the way from the garage to a parking lot miles away without
the need of the motorist touching the steering wheel. It was the image of what a
“driverless world” would be. During the event, Musk announced that the company
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intends to deploy a car with “full autonomous mode” as soon as 2020154 and that Tesla
would have around a million “robot taxis” by the end of 2020. 155 This statement
produced much criticism in specialized media,156 that has been treating this kind of
prediction with more carefulness and skepticism than a couple of years ago when
expectations were on the rise. Another source of doubt is the lack of clarity of what
Tesla means by “full autonomous mode,” because the company has, in the recent past,
used these terms in a different meaning than the SAE International’s autonomy scale.
Critics say that, in creating this confusion of definition, Tesla misleads the general
public that may take less care when driving, because they may think they are using a
more advanced technology - one that permits to not have any attention on the task
of driving - than the one they are really using (that still needs attention from the driver).
In January of 2019, Waymo - a Google subsidiary company - made public its
partnership with Canadian company Magna to create the “world’s first factory 100%dedicated to the mass production of L4 [level 4] autonomous vehicles”157 in Michigan,
“the heart of American automotive industry.” In April, the company announced their
choice for a facility in Detroit, aiming to start the production in mid-2019.158 One of
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the reasons for choosing Detroit is the possibility of testing the cars in different weather
conditions, like snow.
2.3 – Debates in the United States
In the United States, cities and states are in the forefront of regulation and
experimentation of self-driving vehicles. At least fifty percent of American large cities
are studying how to integrate these vehicles in their transport systems. 159 Many of
them are allowing real-world tests.
States and municipalities’ leadership is happening not only because they will
be the most affected by the transformations the technology is promising, but also
because Congress is struggling to agree about Federal legislation over the topic.160 In
2017, the House of Representatives passed the Self Drive Act,161 desiring to accelerate
the adoption of self-driving cars and to block states from creating their own
performance standards.162 The bill, however stopped in the Senate. Because of safety
concerns raised by some senators, a complimentary bill — the AV START Act163 —
failed to pass. Some hopes have been raised that a new bill will be drafted addressing
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the objections of those legislators.164 Representatives of states that already have rules
over self-driving cars also opposed to the bill concerned that it could make USDOT
the only body responsible for setting construction and performance standards. 165 To
a smaller degree, there was also influence of interest groups like the League of
American Bicyclists, who questioned the lack of requirements for the deployment of
these cars and affirmed the Act would “drastically increase the number of vehicles on
our streets which are exempted from federal safety standards.”166
While Congress has not yet acted, the federal response to the emerging
technology is being promoted by the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA) and the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). The
USDOT is “partnering with a broad coalition of industry, academic, states and local,
safety advocacy, and transportation stakeholders to support the safe development,
testing, and deployment of automated vehicle technology,”167 and in 2018, released a
new set of non-prescriptive and entirely voluntary guidelines on how to approach the
deployment of self-driving cars, especially with respect to concerns about safety.
In the absence of federal standards, states are advancing regulations and
directives, contributing to a fragmented legislation. Until mid-March of 2019, at least
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41 states and D.C. have considered legislation related to autonomous vehicles.168 That
absence makes it difficult to deploy cars with unconventional designs without a
steering wheel or brake pedals for example. If the car, however, follows current
conventional design, there is no federal regulatory impediment for the use of a “full
self-driving” software.169 Since the driverless car meets the requirements imposed by
states’ regulations on autonomous vehicles, the deployment is possible. In other
words, if the full autonomy technology was ready, it could be already legally used in
many states.170

2.4 – Debates in Canada
In Canada, there is also no specific federal regulation over autonomous
vehicles. A new bill that can, however, influence that matter received Royal Assent in
March of 2018 and amended the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Although, the Bill S-2 —
Strengthening Motor Vehicle Safety for Canadians Act — did not mention the driverless
technology, it gave to authorities in the area of road safety “greater flexibility to keep
pace with the development of new safety features or new kinds of vehicles,
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technologies, systems or components.”171 The federal government has adopted the
posture of navigator, providing guidelines and reports through Transport Canada.
Since 2018, it has published reports and guidelines for governments, manufacturers
and academia, trying to avoid a fragmented safety and legal framework for the nation
that may permit tests and deployment across the country in a coherent way.
In January 2018, the Council of Ministers of Transportation and Highway
Safety endorsed the report The Future of Automated Vehicles in Canada which
encourages governments to work together with to objective to get the most beneficial
outcomes of the technology. With this objective the report establishes different roles
and responsibilities for each level of government:
[...] the federal government is responsible for establishing a national AV
policy and regulatory framework. Transport Canada is responsible for
keeping vehicle manufacturers accountable for safety standards compliance
and emissions requirements. A national framework on AVs can promote the
standardization and harmonization of AV technology across the country.
The federal government also acts as the facilitator for international
harmonization of technology standards, particularly with the US and Mexico.
Provincial and territorial governments are responsible for creating the
legislative framework for AV testing and deployment within their own
jurisdictions. Provincial and territorial legislation incorporates federal vehicle
safety requirements. Provincial and territorial governments are also
responsible for driver licensing, vehicle registration and insurance, rules of
the road and any changes to highway infrastructure that might be needed
to support AV deployment.
Municipalities execute the legislative and regulatory framework created by
provinces and territories, including AV safety enforcement. They also make
land use decisions and operate transit systems; both could be profoundly
affected by widespread availability of AVs. 172
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In June of that same year, two other reports were published. One by the
Department of Transport Canada, the Testing Highly Automated Vehicles in Canada:
Guidelines for Trial Organizations; and the other by the Canadian Council of Motor
Transport Administrators, The Canadian Jurisdictional Guidelines for the Testing and
Deployment of Highly Automated Vehicles. The publications provide recommendations
as support for Canadian jurisdictions in their planning, and establish sets of voluntary
safety requirements. Both recommend that they must be read and used together as
complimentary work.
In January and February of 2019, as one more step in the construction of a
coherent national policy and regulatory framework, the Policy and Planning Support
Committee (PPSC) Working group on Automated and Connected Vehicles released
the report Automated and Connected Vehicles Policy Framework for Canada; and
Transport Canada published Canada’s Safety Framework for Automated and
Connected Vehicles. Both reports reaffirm the roles of governments.173 PPSC’s report
gives a list of six “foundational principles” that must guide governments, industry and
academia to create shared objectives; find ways to collaborate; and prepare
proactively for when Canada deploys and adopts automated and connected vehicles
on our roads.174 The principles establish that safety is the number one priority.175
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Also in the beginning of 2019, Transport Canada published the Safety
Assessment for Automated Driving Systems in Canada, “a voluntary tool [developed]
to help ADS developers review the safety of vehicles equipped with SAE level 3 to 5
ADS features, which they intend to manufacture, import, operate and/or sell in
Canada.”176 Aiming for a dialogue between industry and government, it provides a list
of 13 performance-based outcomes the vehicles are expected to achieve, trying to
create an environment where developers feel invited to innovate while “ensuring they
take responsibility for the safety of the technologies they deploy on Canadian
roads.”177 By the end of the document, those 13 expected outcomes are broken in
more than 60 questions that must guide the assessment. 178 Like the other federal
reports and publications on this subject, this tool searches for an alignment with the
safety policies of the United States, looking for an integration of the motor vehicle
market in North America.179
The first and only regulation in effect right now in Canada that specifically
addresses self-driving vehicles is the Ontario Regulation 306/15: Pilot Project —
Automated Vehicles.180 In effect since January of 2016, it created a ten-year pilot
program to evaluate the use of automated vehicles on highways and allowed tests on
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Ontario roads under certain conditions. Currently, the program has nine participants
testing ten vehicles.
Through Ontario Regulation 517/18181 that made enhancements to that
regulation, since January of 2019, it became permissible for the public to buy and use
on Ontario roads vehicles with automated driving system operating at level 3 (SAE) if
the vehicle complies with the federal current regulation for and, therefore, is approved
by the federal government. At this moment, though, there are no level 3 vehicles
approved for sale in Canada. The amendment also made it possible to test high level
of automation (level 4) on public roads under strict conditions, and opens the
possibility of testing vehicles without a person in the driver-seat.

2.5 – Liability around the world
Because in the majority of conventional car crashes the driver has the control
over the vehicle, he or she assumes the primary liability for what happens. In cases
involving robot-cars, however, it is not clear how liability will be divided between the
driverless car’s autonomous system and the human driver. 182 In some cars L4 and in
all (future) cars L5, the responsibility for physically driving shifts from the humans inside
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it to the vehicle itself.183 That is important from a legal perspective. In the UK, the case
R v MacDonagh, [1974] 2 All ER 257 (Eng CA) established that the test of whether a
person is physically driving a vehicle184 is whether he or she is “in a substantial sense
controlling the movement and direction of the car.”185 Commenting about the
possibility of this case influencing future cases involving driverless vehicles,
Collingwood writes:
the activity must also fall within the ordinary meaning of the word “drive”
and although the word meant, essentially, to use the driver’s controls for
the purpose of directing the movement of the car, it did not extend to the
activity of a person (such as MacDonagh) who was not in the car, had both
feet in the road, and was making no use of the controls apart from an
occasional adjustment of the steering wheel.
The point is that, with a fully autonomous vehicle, it is difficult to argue that
any persons being carried in the vehicle could be described as driving. 186

This uncertainty is recognized by the U.S. DOT in the third principle it
established for the Federal approach to shaping policy for automated vehicles:
3. We will modernize regulations.
[...] As a starting point and going forward, the Department will interpret and,
consistent with all applicable notice and comment requirements, adapt the
definitions of “driver” and “operator” to recognize that such terms do not
refer exclusively to a human, but may in fact include an automated
system.187

With this, the Department of Transport is accepting the term “driver” as a less
clear concept in the context of driverless cars. 188 Additionally to that, it is difficult to
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identify and separate the various components that may cause a malfunction because,
right now, there is no framework clearly outlining the proportionality of liability
between the third parties responsible for the design of the self-driving systems (the
manufacturer, supplier, software provider or the software operator).189
Trying to mitigate some of those uncertainties, but at the same time creating
privacy concerns190, in 2017 Germany enacted a law demanding that all autonomous
vehicles must install a black box to record the travel’s data and determine liability
during collisions.191 In Japan, “manufacturers will be liable for defects in the system,
but this does not include the software designer or other third parties involved in the
initial design of the vehicle.”192 The National Police Agency of Japan also recommends
the use of black boxes in the cars in test, and in December of 2018 it unveiled a draft
bill, expected to implement the legislation in the first half of 2020, allowing the use of
level 3 automation on Japan’s roads under certain circumstances. The draft bill
demands the installation of data recorders.193 In 2017, the government of UK passed a
bill addressing the liability of insurers and owners of automated vehicles. Under the
Bill HC 143194, when the owner is considered at fault the insurer’s liability can be limited.
The bill also “resolves ambiguity regarding the apportioning of liability between
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insurers and the insured victims involved in AV accidents [...] providing accident victims
faster access to compensation.”195 About that, in 2016, the European Parliament
Members made a recommendation196 to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on
Robotics saying “a mandatory insurance scheme and an accompanying fund to
safeguard full compensation for victims of AV accidents” should be created.197
In Canada, debates about changes over liability in the expectation of
driverless cars are already happening at federal level. The report Driving Change:
Technology and Future of Autonomous Vehicles198 of the Standing Senate Committee
on Transport and Communications published in January of 2018 has a section
dedicated to liability where it expresses concerns about the changes the new
technology may create in the auto insurance market.
witnesses also discussed potential shifts in accident liability. As explained by
the Insurance Institute of Canada, human error has been the predominant
cause of collisions since motor vehicles were first introduced. Accordingly,
both legislation and insurance procedures have developed around “an
expectation of driver error.” However, as automation increases, insurers and
the legal system will also have to consider the role of software errors and
equipment failure in collisions. In the long term, this raises questions about
whether liability will shift entirely from drivers to manufacturers when fully
automated vehicles become the predominant means of transport. 199
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2.6 – Fatal crashes and lawsuits involving driverless cars
About the future of liability in the courts, Calo is correct when he writes that
he is
reasonably convinced U.S. common law is going to adapt to driverless cars
just fine. [...]
When someone creates a product that is supposed to move people around
safely and instead crashes, judges assign liability to whoever built the vehicle
or vehicles involved in the accident.
There are some difficult cases on the horizon. Policymakers will have to
determine just how much safer driverless cars will need to be compared to
human-operated cars before they are allowed — or even mandated — on
public roads.
Courts will have to determine who is responsible in situations where a
human or a vehicle could have intervened but did not. On the one hand,
courts tend to avoid questions of machine liability if they can find a human
operator to blame.200

Indeed, when in 2016 a Tesla car-owner died in a crash while using the
Autopilot mode201, the company was not charged because “the deceased driver
seemingly assumed the risk of engaging the autopilot.”202 The report of the crash
investigation concluded that:
(5) The Tesla’s multiple ADAS and CA technologies, including Autopilot and
FCW, were functional at the time of the crash. Although these technologies
had limitations, the ADAS system did not respond to an impending crash
event.
(6) Regardless of the operational status of the Tesla’s ADAS technologies,
the driver was still responsible for maintaining ultimate control of the vehicle.
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All evidence and data gathered concluded that the driver neglected to
maintain complete control of the Tesla leading up to the crash. 203

In April of 2019, a family of another Tesla car-owner, deceased in March of
2018 while the car was engaged in the Autopilot mode, filed a lawsuit against the
manufacturer. The family claims Tesla was negligent and that their product is defective.
24. As the vehicle approached the US-101/State Highway (SH-85)
interchange, it traveled in the second lane from the left, a lane for continued
travel on southbound US-101. WALTER HUANG used the autopilot features
of the Model X Tesla which had been designed, tested and incorporated by
the Defendants, and each of them, and which such features included
“traffic-aware cruise control” and “autosteer lane-keeping assistance”.
25. As WALTER HUANG approached the paved gore area dividing the main
travel lanes of US-101 from the SH-85 exit ramp, the autopilot feature of the
Tesla turned the vehicle left, out of the designated travel lane, and drove it
straight into a concrete highway median.
26. The above-described Tesla Model X struck and collided with the median
structure with sufficient force and velocity to cause fatal injuries to WALTER
HUANG, who was pulled from the car and pronounced dead several hours
later.
27. At all relevant times herein, Defendants TESLA and DOES 1 through 20,
were negligent and careless in their design, manufacture, testing, marketing,
sale, and maintenance of the 2017 Tesla Model X, and Defendants were
negligent and careless in failing and omitting to provide adequate
instructions and warnings to protect against injuries occurring as a result of
vehicle malfunction and the absence of an effective automatic emergency
braking system, as occurred here.204

Also in March of 2018, the first fatal crash happened involving a pedestrian
and a driverless car. In Tempe, Arizona, an Uber’s Volvo collided and killed Elaine
Herzberg, while she was crossing a road holding her bicycle. 205 The company settled
an agreement with her family. The terms of the agreement are unknown. The safe-
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driver – who was watching a video during the collision – may be charged criminally.
The company, however, will not be charged criminally,206 which caused some
criticism,207 because Uber had disabled the manufacturer’s emergency braking system
that could have possibly saved Herzberg’s life.208 Uber disabled that system to avoid
conflict with the Uber’s own self-driving system, which could cause “jerky” behaviour
of the car.209
There are not yet enough cases to establish patterns or trends. In relation to
what will be discussed in the next chapter, it is important to note, however, especially
in the case of the Herzberg death, that the debates on the media were centralized on
the doubts if the sensors were functioning, if the car detected the pedestrian, and even
if the pedestrian was not to blame210 since she was not crossing in a dedicated cross
point. Debates around the role of the speed of the car, the speed limits of the road
and the road design or the car design were rare.
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2.7 – Automobile as a metaphorical choice
Richards and Smart assert that when law confronts new technology, the
metaphors we use to understand the technology are important.211 “The metaphorical
choice (either implicit or explicit) to design a technology as a new version of an existing
thing has real effects on how research questions are framed and pursued, expanding
or limiting the range of possible results that can be tested and engineered.” 212 Calo
says Judges “rely on metaphor and analogy when reasoning through new
technologies”213 and also litigants “often deploy metaphor and analogy strategically in
an effort to channel the law’s application to a new technology.”214 One simple example
is when e-mails are seen as letters or postcards.215
In the case of robot-cars, the metaphor is clear and explicit. What is less
evident is the consequences for the fact that we think about, understand, and
conceptualize those robots as automobiles. This fact is important for concepts,
engineering, legal, and consumer stages. “Particularly in the context of changing
technologies, the law almost always considers new technology as merely a new form
of something else.”216
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The debates at the governmental level and before courts signal the
technology is and will be treated as an improvement and advancement of the
conventional car. This is self-evident, and may sound trite because it is obvious, and
we cannot escape of framing that new technology in that form. That is not, however,
an irrelevant observation in the sense that “metaphors can constrain thinking,
sometimes in an unnecessarily limiting way (if they rest on old social norms or technical
limitations that are no longer applicable), and sometimes in a way that reflects the
enduring wisdom of the past.”217
The idea around self-driving cars is that they will revolutionize our cities in
many ways. One of the most claimed aspects of that revolution is the end of road
deaths. How can that revolution be limited if this new technology is not seen by the
masses, judges, engineers and lawmakers as really new, but merely as an old
technology with super improvements? Additionally, at the same time, can this
technology be more transformative if we see it as a new object with new forms of
interaction and relations within society and the space it moves about?
This has no answer for now. Maybe - and just maybe – in the future, looking
in hindsight, we may be able to understand the limitations and constraints, and the
consequences of the visions we have today.
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CHAPTER 3
LOOK BOTH WAYS: THE SAFETY ARGUMENT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
DRIVERLESS FUTURE
Can we imagine a world without road deaths? Cities where parents would not
fear letting a 4-year old cross a street not holding hands? The driverless future is
promised as the solution to many of our problems. The most prominent, expected
and advertised promise is the clearance of road statistics from road deaths. The safety
argument, stating that self-driving cars will be safer than human drivers, is the main
selling point toward a driverless future. The car industry, however, sold its product
throughout the last century advertising attributes that in many aspects are opposed
to the idea of safety, like speed and power that allied with a sense of control and
individuality helped to couple the automobile with freedom. How can these attributes
fit into the safety argument? Can the self-driving technology flaws of the present
undermine or delay the achievement of those promises? How may those promises
and flaws shape the space and relations in our cities streets?
Those questions are the basis for the discussion in this last chapter, that is
divided in four main sections. The safety argument is presented in the first one, with
some studies related to the safety of self-driving cars and if they are already in a stage
that allows their deployment. Since it is crucial for the industry to gain public
confidence, this section also present studies that analyse the public opinion about
autonomous vehicles. In the second and third part, we have two opposite perspectives
68

for a driverless future. Starting from difficulties faced nowadays by robot-cars in
dealing with unpredictable situations and the unpredictability of human behaviour,
two futures are foreseen: one where pedestrians and cyclists have great access to the
streets, using the flaws of the technology to their advantage; and another one where,
to prevent pedestrians from disturbing the driverless cars traffic flow, old measures
against pedestrianized spaces and access of people to streets are taken. The last part
proposes the necessity of enlarging the debate around robot-cars including other
aspects – like studies about relations within public space, and what are other already
existing answers for safety problems – that could help reaching the full potential of
the technology as part of a solution for safe and accessible cities.

3.1 - The safety argument
The most used argument for the development and widespread use of
autonomous cars is the safety argument.218 The word “safety,” for example, appears
318 times in the last (2018) U.S Transportation’s report about automated vehicles. 219 In
the Canadian publications from federal entities about driverless cars, safety is also the
main concern and the first item to appear in lists of guidance principles.
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It is no controversy that deaths and injuries caused by automobiles crashes
are one of the leading problems and challenges of contemporary society. Road
collisions are responsible for more than 1.35 million deaths annually and the leading
cause of deaths in children and young adults from 5 to 29 years old around the
world.220 In 2017, there were 1,841 fatalities and at least 9,960 serious injuries on
Canadian roads.221 In the U.S., the champion of road deaths among high-income
countries,222 cars were responsible for estimated 37,133 deaths in 2017,223 and motor
vehicle crashes can be responsible for more than US$800 million in economic and
social costs each year224.
The autonomous car, for many, is a solution with the significant potential to
mitigate this problem. This reasoning is appealing since we have statistics showing that
94% of severe motor vehicles crashes on U.S. roads are caused by driver-related
factors225. These statistics are often used by companies on their websites and by their
representatives in presentations and interviews about the significance and importance
of driverless cars to our society.
Even though companies and governments are betting on the fast
development and extensive use of cars with a high level of automation, some recent
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studies question if, right now, it is possible to affirm that, in the current state of the
technology, driverless cars are at least as safe as human drivers.
One study from 2016 concludes that there is not enough data to derive any
conclusion yet226. Americans drive nearly 3 trillion miles every year with a rate of 77
reported injuries per 100 million miles, and a rate of 1.09 fatalities per 100 million miles
(data from 2013). From 2009 to 2015, Google’s autonomous vehicles fleet, in
autonomous mode, was test-driven only 1.3 million miles.227 The researchers conclude
that:
autonomous vehicles would have to be driven hundreds of millions of miles
and sometimes hundreds of billions of miles to demonstrate their reliability
in terms of fatalities and injuries. Under even aggressive testing
assumptions, existing fleets would take tens and sometimes hundreds of
years to drive these miles — an impossible proposition if the aim is to
demonstrate their performance prior to releasing them on the roads. Only
crash performance seems possible to assess through statistical comparisons
of this kind, but this also may take years. Moreover, as autonomous vehicles
improve, it will require many millions of miles of driving to statistically verify
changes in their performance.“228

The researchers also write that there are alternative methods – like virtual
testing and simulations, and mathematical modelling and analysis – that could
supplement real-world testing, but “even with these methods, it may not be possible
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to establish the safety of autonomous vehicles prior to making them available for
public use. Uncertainty will remain.”229
It is important to observe that the data about Google’s fleet used for that
study dates from 2015. The Google Self-Driving Car Project in 2016 became a new
company itself: Waymo. Nowadays, Waymo’s fleet is bigger than the fleet from the
time of the study, and it has been put to test under real environment conditions in
more than 25 American cities, accumulating over 5 million miles of real-world
experience and over 5 billion miles in simulation.230 Yet, those numbers are still far
below what the study concludes to be necessary to demonstrate the reliability of the
technology.
In August of 2018, The Information,231 a known website specialized in
technology, reported issues with Waymo’s cars currently in test on public roads. It
informed that the company’s vehicles were having “difficulty making unprotected left
turns, distinguishing between individuals in a large group, and merging into turn lanes
and highway traffic, among other trouble areas.”232
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Recently released by that same website,233 a report on the driverless industry
raised setbacks that Waymo’s most prominent adversary — Cruiser Automation — is
having with its cars. The report shows that the number of crashes, random brakes and
erratic steering — causing not only discomfort to the passengers, but real nearcollision events — are much more frequent than the company expected to deal with
by this time. There are too many problems. That takes from the company the
confidence to launch a ride-hailing service. The vehicles were taking 80% longer to
complete a trip than a human driver, and “several months” before the release of the
report, they were close to having a collision around once every 450 miles. The
company’s goal was to reduce that rate to once every 1,000 miles by the end of 2018.
During that year, Cruiser Automation’s vehicles had a rate between 6 and 12 incidents
every 10 miles. By the end of 2019, the company expects its vehicle to be between
merely 5% to 10% as safe as human-driven vehicles. This mark is well below what the
public expects from driverless cars to be in order to fearlessly accept them in the
market.
A 2019 Chinese study also points out that, at this moment, there is not
sufficient data to determine the benefits and costs of driverless cars to society, and it
is not possible to make a formal cost-benefit analysis. It also says that the reported
results of autonomous vehicle safety are conflicting.234 The objective of that study was
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to create data that would help the debate about “how safe is safe enough for selfdriving vehicles?” Their survey results showed that to be accepted by the public in the
marketplace, the driverless vehicle must be 4 to 5 times as safe as human drivers,
which means that it has to reduce the current traffic fatalities by at least 75-80%.235 It
is necessary, though, to say that the group selected for that study was a small sample
formed by people from only one city in China. The researchers make clear that it is
not possible to generalize their findings to the general population, and that further
studies must be made.236
Another study endorses that concern. With samples collected in Israel, the
United States and Canada, it shows significant differences between these regions
concerning the acceptance to AVs. The research demonstrates that while 54% of
Americans tended to favour regular cars, only 35% of Israelis chose for traditional cars.
237

The Americans that chose autonomous cars tended to choose private autonomous

vehicles instead of shared autonomous vehicles (ride-hailing system with a yearly
subscription cost), while Israelis that opted for autonomous vehicles had a more even
distribution between those two options.
The study also concludes that the perception and preferences about AVs are
influenced by other variables like commute time, income, gender, age and education.
The ones that always chose the regular car were, on average, more likely to be female,
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older, less educated and with a lower income than the overall average. 238 Those with
a longer commute time tended to favour autonomous vehicles. Gender does not play
an important role in the choice decision for Americans. Israeli women were less likely
to use shared autonomous vehicles than men, which the researchers hypothesized as
a result of cultural differences between North America and the Middle East in relation
to gender. Also, the higher the education, the higher the individual favoured the use
of AVs. On that point, the researchers also speculate that maybe those who are more
educated are more open to new ideas and technologies.
It is important to highlight a few aspects of the methodology utilized in this
research. The surveys were distributed online through social media, making sure that
all the respondents were drivers that used cars to commute to work or school. A total
of 721 individuals completed the survey, whose answers led to a total of 4260 usable
observations. From this total, 1920 usable observations were obtained from the U.S.
and Canada, 2109 from Israel, and 231 from other global locations. Maybe, though,
the most important aspect is that the surveys were answered almost five years ago, in
September and November of 2014. In the last few years, not only we had some
important advancements in the autonomy technology, but the media increased the
coverage of these achievements and also gave a huge coverage of the first fatalities
related to driverless cars. Another important fact is that ride-hailing service, such as
Uber, was still in its early stage, not being as popular as it is nowadays. These facts
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open the question about how different could be the results of this survey if it was
made today.
A survey conducted by the AAA in January of 2019 informs that 71% of
Americans are afraid to ride in a fully self-driving vehicle, but 55% believe that by 2029
most cars will be capable to drive themselves. The survey also suggests that drivers
who use advanced driver assistance systems are much more comfortable with the idea
of riding in driverless cars.239 In a study made with insurance consumers published in
October of 2018, executed by J.D. Power and the National Association of Mutual
Insurance Companies (U.S.), 45% of the respondents marked they would require 100%
level of safety (0% of error) before they ride in a fully automated vehicle, and 38%
marked they would never ride it independently of the safety level.240
Those surveys show that the vast majority of Americans are afraid of using
driverless cars. That shows one of the major challenges of driverless companies is to
gain the confidence of the public that their product is safe and reliable, which
demonstrates the prominence of the safety argument for the industry.
In March of 2019, the National Research Council of Canada (NRC) published
a report on the literature about autonomous vehicles and connected vehicles
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awareness. The report says there are not many studies on public awareness about new
technologies involving Advanced Driver Assistance Systems and most governmental
websites around the world primarily focus on “technology development, infrastructure,
policy and regulations related to advanced vehicle technologies. Some sources
mention technology acceptance, but public education and awareness were rarely
mentioned.”241 The report also affirms the majority of available sources across multiple
sources focus on an education to “promote acceptance and marketing of the
technology.”242 The study warns that an acceptance without “proper education,
communication, awareness and understanding may lead to consumer fear based on
misperception or lead to over-reliance on the technologies with potential impacts to
safety.”243

3.2 - Driverless cities and the creation of pedestrians’ paradises
Journalist Aarian Marshall starts her article for Wired Magazine about her
experience in the backseat of a Cruise Automation’s driverless car stating: “Nothing
will make you hate humans — capricious, volatile, unplanned, erratic humans — like
sitting in the back of self-driving car.”244 After complaining about walkers, bicyclists and
human drivers that were always alarming the driverless car with their erratic actions,
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she continues asking “why couldn’t they be like this autonomous vehicle: extra
cautious, considerate, aware?”245 Right after these complaints, she accepts that
this chaos [however] — this unpremeditated waltz of oops, no, you go and
nope, buster, me first — is reality. It’s how cities work. Which means that if
a car is going to drive itself, no humans drivers involved, it must get very
good at doing something very hard: interpreting and anticipating the
behavior of humans.246

To see the world, driverless cars use a mix of different sensors and technology
- light detection and ranging (lidar), radar, ultrasound devices and computer vision requiring a complex data fusion247. To understand the world, the robot-car must
postprocess the data captured by the sensors making estimations and matching
patterns.248 If a scene - or if a sensor does not function properly - does not match with
the expected patterns, the driverless car may not be able to precisely understand what
is happening and, therefore, may not act correctly and in time.
A self-driving car must deal with a huge number of variables existent in the
real world. Beneath the most unpredictable variables, are the ones related to humans’
actions.
A key challenge in human-robot interaction is developing high fidelity
models for the human agent. Without these models, the robot agent cannot
properly predict human behaviors and respond appropriately. This problem
is difficult, however, given the unpredictability of the human agent. Thus,
there is a tradeoff between trying to be robust to all possible sets of human
behavior, or focusing solely on the most likely actions. Another challenge is
that each human is different. Each person has varying physical and cognitive
capabilities and different preferences and expectations from the robot
agent. In addition, they may change preferences over time, based on their
affective (emotional) state. This problem is especially relevant in the
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intelligent vehicle domain, where autonomous vehicles must collaborate
with human passengers and other human drivers.249

Indeed, within the interaction between road users, there is “a complex blend
of physical design, psychology, social norms, and other factors.”250 One of the greatest
challenges for autonomous driving is how to deal with the uncertainty factor of human
behaviour. As researchers put it in a work published in 2018:
the major outstanding challenge for real-world autonomous vehicles is to
operate in environments containing people. Unlike static (and ballistic)
environments, people are complex interactive agents having their own
goals, utilities, and decision making systems, and interactions with them
must take these into account in order to predict their actions and plan
accordingly.”251

One study shows some of our patterns while trying to cross a street. The
”pedestrian crossing behaviour can be divided into 3 phases: approaching (stable
speed), appraising (deceleration due to evaluation of speed and distance of oncoming
vehicles) and crossing (acceleration).”252 Some other studies, trying to understand
interactions between drivers and pedestrians, found eye contact plays an important
role253; that in 90% of the time pedestrians reveal their intention of crossing by looking
at the approaching vehicles, and that pedestrians can use gaze to influence drivers
behaviour to make them stop more often at crossings254. It also was demonstrated
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that vehicles usually “win” an interaction with a pedestrian, which means that the
pedestrian - the loser - had to yield for the car. This is an expected result when the
forces in the equation (interaction) have different strengths255, and one has much more
to lose (pedestrians can face death or be maimed) than the other (drivers can face the
trouble of the judicial system and money loss).256
Yes, our actions are recognizable and predictable by patterns. In theory, we
can gather all the possible different behaviours in all possible situations and assemble
the collected data into a machine, creating a driverless car that can predict human
behaviour with perfection. The reality, though, is that the variety of possibilities and
the number of variables involved in each one of these patterns make the work to
recognize them a herculean — if not impossible — process. Yet, despite the
difficulties, researchers are putting their efforts into it.
Trying to solve that issue, a group of researchers explains that “considerable
research has been conducted on navigation among pedestrians”257 and different
approaches are in test and construction. Some ignore pedestrians’ intentions and
interactions, treating them as static obstacles; others consider their intentions but not
explicitly model their interactions, trying to predict trajectories from pedestrians’
patterns learned from previous data. The problem, though, with those data-driven
approaches is the difficulty to make predictions in new scenarios. Some algorithms
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have modeled both intentions and interactions, but still without the necessary
emphasis on uncertainty.258
London startup Humanising Autonomy is creating an artificial intelligence
“powered technology that is able to predict the full range of pedestrian and vulnerable
road user behaviour in real time” and “develop natural interactions between people
and autonomous vehicles.”259 The co-founder Raunaq Bose explains they noticed the
automotive industry’s view of automated vehicles was not taking into account the
vulnerable road users outside the vehicle in the way the startup founders thought the
industry should.260 Because the vehicles will need to interact and understand the
detailed communication between road users to navigate complex urban
environments, the focus of the startup is a “human-centred implementation of
autonomous technology”261. With deep learning and deep reinforcement, the startup
uses culture and context specific predictions to “capture the full complexity of human
behaviours in urban environments around the world.”262 The intention is that the
technology can be used anywhere on the globe, independently of cultural differences
in the behaviour, learning and improving from new detected activities.
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The difficulty of dealing with human complexity pushes companies, at least
for now, to a cautious approach in the way driverless cars behave. When facing any
minimal possibility of collision, the car stops. That behaviour makes the travel clumsy
and slow, because the machine uses the breaks, often abruptly, much more than a
human driver would. At this stage, where we are still figuring out how to deal with the
human unexpected behaviours, that caution is necessary to avoid any risk of harm and
to reduce any unwanted outcome from a system failure.
Apart from the “jerky” characteristic, it is not a problem per se that robots that
can harm us are super cautious, more responsible and risk averse than the average
human. In fact, that is exactly how every human driver should always be, and that is
the most relevant characteristic that can make the robot-cars superior to us on the
road. Assuming that manufacturers continue to produce autonomous cars with those
qualities, that leads us to question how pedestrians may behave if driverless cars
become the great majority of the automobiles and the pedestrians get confident
about the risk aversion and safety of the technology.
Why do pedestrians not simply step on the streets whenever they want?
Besides social pressure and law enforcement, in part, it is because they know there is
a chance the driver is distracted, intoxicated, or even psychologically unhealthy. 263
Also, the pedestrian needs to consider the velocity of the automobile and calculate if
it will have any chance to safely reduce the speed and stop before a collision. To cross
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a street always involves a probability calculation of the odds of (not) being hit. How
paradigm shifting it would be if pedestrians had the certainty that they could cross the
streets anywhere and anytime they want without any chance of being slaughtered by
an automobile? Nowadays, motor vehicles are the winners in most interactions with
pedestrians, but with the cautious and responsible robot-car, some say pedestrians
may be the new winners.
Paradoxically, this cautious and risk avoidance behaviour in support to the
safety argument – sold by the industry and government agencies as the most
prominent and attractive quality of a driverless world – can become the main reason
to retard a manufacturers’ (highly profitable) utopia.
Taking the premise of a paradigm change, Millard-Ball envisions the
possibility of a “pedestrian supremacy.”264 Cyclists and pedestrians, becoming aware
of driverless cars’ cautiousness, would “exploit” that characteristic and be confident to
behave more erratic than today. With diminished risks of collisions, pedestrians would
not have great concerns to cross the streets. They would not need, therefore, to be as
cautious as nowadays. This new societal behaviour - without the concern about being
hit by car - would break pedestrian’s patterns we are used to, creating more
uncertainty. Consequentially, that would reinforce driverless car behaviour, making
them act even more cautious when surrounded by humans. That would slow down
motorized trips, especially in the heart of the urban neighbourhoods, leading to a
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society where walking or cycling are quicker alternatives and, therefore, more
advantageous. Self-driving cars would be used almost solely to travel around the
edges of those urban neighbourhoods, dropping the passengers on its limits. That
dynamic would encourage a virtuous cycle of increasingly pedestrian and cycling
activity, leading to more urban density, that in turn pushes to even more nonmotorized mobility.
In a future like that, cars would stay far from being the best option for most
trips in the city. It would be like a paradise for walking and cycling. If driverless cars’
industry continues to use the safety argument as the main selling point of the
technology and ultra cautiousness as the main support for that argument, the reality
can become similar to that pedestrian’s heaven. The doubt is if a pedestrian’s utopia
can become a nightmare for the driverless industry’s profits.

3.3 - Look both ways before crossing the street
For some, a future of pedestrian supremacy must be seen as a problematic
“jaywalking paradise,”265 where autonomous vehicles “will never get anywhere,”266 once
people realize “these cars are programmed to stop when they cross the streets.”267
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This was one of the topics discussed during a panel in New York City in 2016, where
several panelists agreed that Manhattan will be a “unique stress test for the new
vehicles because of the obstacles its clogged street grid provides, with cars in transit
joined by a glut of pedestrians, increasing numbers of bicyclists, and, of course, the
ubiquitous double-parked cars.”268
In his article We Need New Rules for Self-Driving Cars, Stilgoes recalls the
sociologist Brian Wynne’s thoughts, remembering he
argued that the reality of technology was far messier than normally assumed
by experts. Technology, for Wynne, was “a form of large-scale, real time
experiment,” the implications of which could never be fully understood in
advance. Technological societies could kid themselves that things were
under control, but there would always be moments in which they would
need to work things out as they were going along. 269

Indeed, some recent trials of self-driving minibuses and cars in real
environments raise doubts, like the one above, over what is the best way to deploy
the technology in places with lots of pedestrians and cyclists like some areas of
metropolises such as New York and Toronto.
Right now, in Hong Kong, a driverless minibus that can carry ten passengers
is making real-world test trips during specific days in an arts hub district, originally
dedicated only for pedestrians and non-motorized vehicles.270 The shuttle is still under
authorities’ scrutiny. “If [such buses] have to drive through a heavily pedestrianised
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area, they basically have to stand still all the time,” 271 complains Zimmerman, the
founder of the group Designing Hong Kong, who refers to the minishuttle as a
“beeping monster”, because of the alarm the vehicle sounds whenever it encounters
an obstacle and stops. Zimmerman also complains about the possibility that, to solve
this problem, the bus may require a separated road, which means the district will not
be a pedestrian-only zone as it was initially supposed to be.272
Despite that type of complaint and authorities’ doubts, a survey found the
majority of the 6,000 visitors that took part in the minibus trial run support the system.
It points out that one of the passengers interviewed by the newspaper South China
Morning Post says the district would have to solve the practical issue of “how to prevent
people from going near [the minibus] all the time,” making it stop constantly and that
the “autonomous shuttle system should serve the whole district in the future.”273
In June of 2019, in Stockholm, while participating in the Global Public
Transport Summit, the transit journalist and author Carlton Reid posted on the social
media Twitter: “stepping in front of a driverless pod at @uitpsummit in Stockholm.
Autonomous vehicles are going to be so much fun for pedestrians and cyclists.”274
Under those lines, he posted a 47 seconds video of himself “pranking” a minibus that
was in use in the area of the summit. Every time the shuttle moved, he stepped in front
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of it, making the minibus abruptly stop and sound an alarm that increased as the time
goes by. He ends joking and laughing: “you [the minibus] are not going anywhere.”
That kind of attitude is also happening toward cars. Because it is a novelty,
and people are learning about the ultra-cautious behaviour, Bloomberg reports
pranks are not a rare problem:
Some people just can’t suppress the urge to test the technology’s artificial
reflexes. Waymo, which is owned by Alphabet Inc., routinely encounters
pedestrians who deliberately try to ‘prank’ its cars, continually stepping in
front of them, moving away and then stepping back in front of them, to
impede their progress.275

In some localities, real attackers, not pranksters, are the problem for driverless
companies. In a sort of return of the attackers from the early days of the conventional
car last century or the Luddites from the 19th century, residents of an American city
are throwing rocks, slashing tires, threatening with PVC pipes and even guns the
Waymo’s cars and their emergency drivers. During 2017 and 2018, the Police
Department of Chandler, Arizona, documented at least 21 attacks, assaults or
threats.276
The explanation some of the attackers give range from safety concerns to fear
of losing their jobs by reason of automation. A couple received police warnings
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multiple times for deliberately making the self-driving car “brake hard” or forcing it to
pull over. They try to justify their actions accusing Waymo’s car of almost hitting their
10-year-old son while playing in a blind alley. They told The New York Times that “they
said they need real-world examples, but I don’t want to be their real-world mistake.
[...] They didn’t ask us if we wanted to be part of their beta test.” 277 Police reports that
in many cases, Waymo prefers to simply avoid neighbourhoods where they faced
those behaviours or residents’ complains.278
Criminal actions, especially involving threats, violence or the possibility of
harm, must be taken seriously and are not justifiable. Yet, what that couple said about
not having been asked about being part of a test and the fear of becoming part of a
bad outcome of an experiment raises an issue of informed consent for the public.
Professor Cummings, in an opinion article where she writes about the need for
interdisciplinary research in this field, says that moral question has not been sufficiently
debated and is one of the many unknowns that appears with the development of selfdriving cars and the government authorizations to real-world tests279. Having in sight
that neither the United States nor Canada have federal legislation about minimum
safety standards for autonomous vehicles but both have regulation mandating that all
humans involved in an experiment should explicitly give their consent, she asks and
argues:
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Should drivers be given the option to share the road with one or more
driverless vehicles undergoing testing, especially without safety monitors?
These cars have no established minimum safety standards, and the state
evaluators who would determine road worthiness and public safety are not
likely to have the appropriate background to make the judgment. At a
minimum, discussion is warranted about clearly marking the driverless cars
that are undergoing testing, so that drivers who are sharing the road have
some understanding of the test environment for which they did not
volunteer.280

Although many of those criminal behaviours may be based on irrationality,
misinformation, or wrong analysis of the facts281, they are to some degree expected
with the deployment of this new technology. Trying to avoid those kind of violent
reactions and also admitting the difficulties around the unpredictability of human
behaviour, the driverless car startup Drive.Ai — recently acquired by Apple282 after
almost going out of business — prefers a different approach from most companies.
Instead of trying to make the car seem “normal”, they use flashy colours and big letters
on all the sides announcing that it is a self-driving car. The most noticeable difference,
however, is the use of external signages that communicate to pedestrians the intention
and actions of the car, and if it is on driverless or manual mode. For example, a
pedestrian can read “waiting for you to cross.”
Even though there are studies showing that putting visual alerts on the
vehicles does not produce the expected results283, Andrew Ng — a machine learning
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researcher who invested in Drive.Ai — believes that “self-driving cars should be made
visually distinctive, so that people can quickly recognize them” because “even with
great AI technology, it is safer if everyone recognizes our cars.”284 Writing about what
he believes to be the key elements to provide a public self-driving car service he says:
The industry must take a human-centered approach to safety — taking into
account both people inside and outside the car — and emphasize
communications and community education.
Whether a self-driving car is safe depends not only on the behavior of the
car itself, but also on the behavior of the people around it. It is unwise to
rely exclusively on AI technology to ensure safety. Instead, the self-driving
industry also has to think about the people who will be outside the vehicle,
which is why we will be undertaking community-wide education and training
programs where we operate.285

In a report about the challenges that will probably delay the deployment of a
full scale use of driverless cars, the website The Verge says Ng ”argues the problem is
less about building a perfect driving system than training bystanders to anticipate selfdriving behavior. In other words, we can make roads safe for the cars instead of the
other way around.”286 When asked by the website about possible difficulties of the
technology on how to behave in front of unpredictable cases — for example, a
pedestrian on a pogo stick — he answers that most AI teams would have no problem
to handle a pogo stick user pedestrian on a crosswalk, but that ”bouncing on a pogo
stick in the middle of a highway would be a really dangerous. [...] Rather than building
AI to solve the pogo stick problem, we should partner with the government to ask
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people to be lawful and considerate. [...] Safety isn’t just about the quality of the AI
technology.”287
Condemning this vision, roboticist and emeritus professor at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) Rodney Brooks argued this is a shortcut for the
deployment of self-driving cars without fulfilling the safety promises made by the
industry:
He is giving up on the promise of self-driving cars seamlessly slotting into
the existing infrastructure. Now he is saying that every person, every
“bystander”, is going to be responsible for changing their behavior to
accommodate imperfect self-driving systems. And they are all going to have
to be trained! I guess that means all of us. [...] The great promise of selfdriving cars has been that they will eliminate traffic deaths. Now Professor
[Ng] is saying that they will eliminate traffic deaths as long as all humans are
trained to change their behavior? What just happened? 288

Just as the risk-averse and ultra-cautious approach is not a problem in itself,
education and training programs are also not problematic depending on how they
are addressed. Having in mind the automobile history lessons from last century —
although the intention of Drive.Ai may be an education in a way to simply diminish
unrealistic fears the population may have — the idea of “training” the pedestrians
because the technology is not perfected to the point of recognizing pedestrian
gestures and intentions and not being able to properly handle unpredictable events
raises justifiable concerns among those who desire the technology to be used to
completely change injuries and deaths statistics and to transform society’s car-centred
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perspective. It also raises the question of how much patience companies and public
authorities have to wait for a safe deployment of the technology without the need of
more law enforcement toward pedestrians and cyclists, or transforming city’s
infrastructure around autonomous vehicles’ needs at the expense of other means of
transportation.
Because of the challenges and difficulties around the “pedestrians-cyclistsbehaviour-safety theme,” one relatively frequent discussion in academia is how can
autonomous vehicles communicate with people outside the car (communication
vehicle-to-pedestrian or simply V2P). Most works do not rely on external physical signs
like the ones used by Drive.Ai, but on the use of mobile devices like smartphones.
Hussein et al.289 developed an application for smartphones that sends the
pedestrian location to autonomous vehicles and vice-versa, and using a “collision
prediction algorithm,”290 “both pedestrians and vehicles can anticipate each others
maneuvers and identify if there is a possibility of collision.”291 The researchers conclude
that “results showed a good performance and high detection rate, as well as high user
satisfaction derived from the interaction with the system.” 292
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Cummings, Clamann and Huang293, however, conducted an experiment that
came to a different result from the one above. Their study “intended to look at the
behaviors of pedestrians crossing a road while texting on a smartphone that would
also alert them to the presence of an oncoming car, with varying degrees of
reliability.”294 The results showed that pedestrians who were given smartphone aural
and visual alerts of varying reliability while engaging in distracted walking had similar
results of other observational research studies looking at typical pedestrians. In other
words, the electronic warning approach may not be effective.
Although, it was not the original intention of the experiment, Cummings,
Clamann and Huang found that cultural differences played an important role in the
results, with significant variation between Americans and Asians’ behaviour. That
finding suggests that
More research is needed to examine these theories in more detail but
understanding these divergent viewpoints is needed in order to inform both
vehicle and infrastructure design in the future. As cars with more automation
increasingly move into various cultures, it is not clear that software designed
in Silicon Valley that models rule-abiding pedestrians in the US will perform
in the same way if deployed to a country in Asia, France, or any other
number of countries. In addition, the creation of safer, more protected
pedestrian spaces in countries where people routinely ignore crossing
signals and warnings is another area of needed research. 295

With a different approach, Gelbal et al. developed a pedestrian-to-vehicle
(P2V) communication296. In case the autonomous vehicle’s sensors fail to detect
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someone crossing the street, the pedestrian’s smartphones could be used as an
additional safety step and communicate to the car the pedestrian’s position and then
the automobile could change its path avoiding the collision. Their simulation had good
results, but they had to assume the pedestrian mobile had a specific type of
communication (DSRC communication).
One common — and alarming — point of argument between Hussein et al.
and the Cummings, Clamann and Huang studies is the results related to user’s
overconfidence on the alert system. Hussein et al. found it “particularly remarkable
that some subjects stated that they would ignore the traffic risks and rely completely
on the warnings of a mobile application.”297 In the same direction, Cummings, Clamann
and Huang note that overall in their study, “people trusted the alert app more than
they did their own judgement, even when the app generated late alerts. This study
demonstrates just how critical the timing is for these devices and if such alerts are even
a second late, the results could be fatal.”298
Although systems like the ones above may be theoretically a good approach,
the users’ overconfidence on these alerts in addition to the overconfidence of drivers
in today’s Advanced Driver Assistance Systems — ADAS — like Tesla’s “autopilot
mode,” can cause the opposite desired outcome. The best conclusion is that more
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studies and experiments before using a mobile alert system through P2V and V2P are
still necessary.
Moreover, the fact that this is being seen by some as an implementable
improvement to autonomy safety may be an indication the driverless technology is
not yet ready to be deployed as soon as some manufacturers desire. On this point,
one problem raised by Cummings, Clamann and Huang is that self-driving companies
that are already authorized to test the vehicles in real-environments are collecting that
type of information “at levels researchers never could,” but independent researchers
have no access to the data. The authors argue that companies “allowing non-partisan
researchers to access this data and develop safety-based models to be shared across
all manufacturers” would be a good way to prevent future fatalities and fast-forward
research aiming to develop solutions that could benefit both society and the industry.
It is very unlikely, though, that — in a competition involving multi-billion dollar
investments and high profits for the winners — companies will easily share their
knowledge and data.
3.3.1 – The pedestrian problem
The industry is constantly promising that a large scale use – without changing
current infrastructure – of 4 or 5 level autonomous cars is near. How to make that
possible with the challenges reported in this chapter? Can the automobile continue to
be as attractive as it is today in a world where lawful and highly risk-averse robot-cars
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will be slow when surrounded by big crowds of pedestrians or cyclists and will be
constantly stopping whenever a pedestrian tries to step into its way?
Because of those kind of doubts, Millard-Ball not only envisioned a possible
“pedestrian supremacy,” but also a scenario of “regulatory response:”
In this scenario, policy makers react to the impunity shown by pedestrians
with a combination of regulatory changes, physical design, and
enforcement. Laws are changed to reduce pedestrian priority, for example,
by eliminating unmarked crosswalks at intersections. Physical barriers in the
form of fences between the sidewalk and roadway are erected to corral
pedestrian traffic along busy streets, marking a return to the mid-20th
century street designs that emphasize segregation of road users.
Enforcement action against jaywalkers and similar violators is stepped up,
and legislation specifies that an autonomous vehicle manufacturer is not
liable for any collision where a pedestrian was unlawfully present in the
roadway.299

If policy makers embrace the idea of using methods from the past — and that
are still in use — to turn around the challenges of driverless cars as a way to accelerate
the deployment, that “regulatory response” scenario may be a real possibility. Just like
the idea of “make roads safe for the cars instead of the other way around”300 expressed
by the Drive.Ai investor, other people from inside the industry are talking about the
necessity of measures similar to the ones from the early days of the conventional car
in order to make that deployment possible.
The concerns raised in the panel cited in the beginning of section 3.3 are in
the core of that possible future imagined by Millard-Ball. Although three years have
passed since that panel happened — the same year Millard-Ball’s paper was published
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— those same worries still remain beneath some industry insiders, researchers and
policy makers as a recent article of The New York Times indicates.
With the title How Jaywalking Could Jam Up the Era of Self-Driving Cars,301 the
reportage states that places like Manhattan “poses a pedestrian problem,” because “if
pedestrians know they’ll never be run over, jaywalking could explode, grinding traffic
to a halt.”302 A former head of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration who
nowadays works as chief safety innovation officer in a self-driving startup said to the
newspaper that “with autonomous vehicles, the technical stuff will get worked out. It’s
the societal part that’s the most challenging.”303 The report says the “solution”
proposed by an automotive industry official to this “pedestrian problem” is “gates at
each corner, which would periodically open to allow pedestrians to cross.”304
In an even more explicit thought in that direction, during a podcast episode
about autonomous vehicles, while talking about a possible partnership between
private and public sector in Japan, a former General Motor’s director of global social
media said the industry could:
deliberately [pick] a small town and with the mayor and city council [...]
committed to [rebuild] the entire town around the idea of autonomous
vehicles. So You have got now city planners and people who are running
an entire village determining that we are gonna try moving to the future
and see this works. That's really cool. It's not just about the technology, it is
about what happens around the technology.
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[...]
It [the deployment of driverless cars] is gonna happen. Now we just have to
start conditioning people to recognize that there is a learning process along
the way.305

A few days before that Times’ publication, during an event titled
“Autonomous Cars: Science, Technology, and Policy,”306 the Director of the Intelligent
Transportation Systems Joint Program Office (United States Department of
Transportation — DOT) remembered the six principles the document Preparing for
the future of transportation, Automated Vehicles 3.0 establishes for a clear Federal
approach to shaping policy for automated vehicles. The sixth principle states clearly
that the United States Government will not try to use the autonomous vehicle to shift
the past century view that relates highway to freedom, and automobile to individuality.
The document says:
6. We will protect and enhance the freedoms enjoyed by Americans.
U.S. DOT embraces the freedom of the open road, which includes the
freedom for Americans to drive their own vehicles. We envision an
environment in which automated vehicles operate alongside conventional,
manually-driven vehicles and other road users. We will protect the ability of
consumers to make the mobility choices that best suit their needs. We will
support automation technologies that enhance individual freedom by
expanding access to safe and independent mobility to people with
disabilities and older Americans.307

As seen in the first chapter, that “freedom of the open road” and the “freedom
for Americans to drive their own vehicles” came at the expense of public transit
investments, safety of pedestrians and cyclists. The urban infrastructure and
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investment choices of the last century made it much easier and safer to move around
cities inside a car. That was the opposite of protecting “the ability of consumers to
make the mobility choices that best suit their needs,” because this system creates the
need for an automobile. If the population in general does not feel safe to cycle, and
cannot rely on a good public transit system, the automobile — for those who can
afford it — becomes the easier and logical choice.

3.3.2 – Heads up! Watch out for petextrians!
Given the challenges involving pedestrians’ and cyclists’ behaviour, and the
safety argument and the infrastructure we have today, it is unclear when the
technology will be ready to provide faster, less “jerky,” and more “human like” travels
inside crowded cities. The discussion in this sections suggests it is also unclear what
investors and authorities would do if the technology takes longer to surpass those
challenges than previously predicted and if they would accept the idea of using old
methods to accelerate the deployment of the new car.
In 2017, Ford Company released a new version of its Ford Fusion model.308
One major improvement of that version was a Pre-collision Assist with Pedestrian
Detection. In one of the websites dedicated to promote this feature, Ford argues that
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collisions involving pedestrians are on the rise in recent years.309 The cause of this
problem, the company says, is the rise of a new type of jaywalker: the “petextrian,” the
person that walks and texts or talks to a mobile simultaneously.310 A Ford safety
engineer says they “were startled to see how oblivious people could be of a 4,000pound car coming toward them, [...] It was a real eye-opener to how distracted people
are today.”311 The company announces that the system is “one step ahead of
pedestrians,” and it “helps predict distracted ‘petextrians’ movement.”
To demonstrate how the collision avoidance system works, Ford released a
video titled “Watch out for petextrians!”312 with comic intentions, where actors played
afraid, worried, careful drivers surrounded by stereotyped walkers on their mobiles: a
careless mother, a distracted teenager, a hipster juggler and an angry businessman.
Summarizing, one of the “jaywalkers” recklessly crosses the street and is saved by the
collision avoidance system. The video ends saying that the system helps keeping
“everyone safe from petextrians.”
Although Ford’s website mentions in one sentence of the text that it is not
only pedestrians but also “the rise of distracted driving due to smartphones” that
“created a massive new safety problem,” the focus of the website is clearly on the
pedestrians’ behaviour. The short ad film is even more obvious about who is to blame,
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even though, in Toronto, 67% of pedestrians hit by a car had the right of the way.313
That type of advertisement can lead to the wrong perception that pedestrians are the
ones to accuse for the majority of their own injuries.
The most probable way the deployment will occur is in a slow-paced
movement. It is highly improbable the market “jumps” from today’s cars straight to
highly automated vehicles. Besides the technological difficulties and the high prices,
especially for the traditional manufacturers — that have great hardware expertise, but
are still grasping over the software construction — from a profit point of view, it is
better to improve conventional cars year after year with more sophisticated driver
assistance systems. Even though we must not conclude future publicity will follow the
same path, the way the Pre-collision Assist with Pedestrian Detection was advertised
may indicate how part of the industry can approach the “pedestrian problem.”
To be lawful is one of the most proclaimed characteristics of the robot-car
toward a future with virtually zero fatalities. Technologies, however, “do not just follow
rules. They also write new ones.”314 In that Times report, along with those statements,
the journalist writes the arrival of Level 4 autonomous vehicles in the market “makes
the formulation of new rules for cities and citizens imperative,” 315 and that
those rules are being contemplated by such organizations as the Society for
Automotive Engineers, university transportation departments and Partners
for Automated Vehicle Education, a recently formed industry and academic
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coalition that is conducting autonomous vehicle demo days, workshops and
other activities.316

With no clear evidence317 that pedestrians’ distraction is the cause of a rise in
pedestrians’ deaths in recent years, and in what resembles the first law against
jaywalking in Los Angeles last century, cities, states and provinces in the United States
and Canada have proposed or passed bills against “petextrians,” or “phone zombies”
as they are called by Canadian media.318 The first city to pass a bill of this kind was the
capital of Hawaii, Honolulu, in July of 2017. Soon after, other localities had similar bill
proposals.319 In Canada, explicitly inspired by Honolulu’s example,320 Ontario
introduced Bill 11, Phones Down, Heads Up Act, 2018321 that establishes fines ranging
from fifty Canadian Dollars to a hundred and twenty five Canadian Dollars to
pedestrians that “cross a roadway while holding and using a wireless communication
device, electronic entertainment device or other prescribed device.”322
Some worries about distracted pedestrians comes from two studies: a 2013
American study323 that was featured in some major American newspapers 324 estimating
that more than 1500 pedestrians were treated in emergency rooms for using a mobile
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while walking and from a report of the US Governors Highway Safety Association
stating that the number of pedestrian deaths from 2010 to 2015 in the United States
raised 25 percent and that “a contributing factor” for that number “may be the rapidly
growing use of smart phones to access wireless data while walking and driving.”325
It is important to note that the numbers from the 2013 study, even though
they attract attention,326 represented only 3% of the overall pedestrians injuries and
they were not related only to traffic events but to any kind of accident — on road or
not — suffered by walkers. Also, around 70% of the injuries were related to talking in
the mobile, not texting. About the GHSA report’s numbers, if we compare it to the
United Kingdom’s pedestrian deaths during the same period - from 2010 to 2015 —
the argument that the pedestrians distracted by smartphone are possibly the chief
cause maybe cannot be sustained.327 Even though, during this time, the UK also saw a
boom in the use of smartphones, pedestrian deaths remained stable.
Research shows that our attention drops when we walk and use a mobile.
Traffic statistics, however, show that, in cities like Toronto, the vast majority of
pedestrians injured by automobiles were in their right of way, and it can be even a
higher number if we take into account that there is no certainty if the pedestrian was
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at fault in 19%328 of collisions involving pedestrians’ injuries in that city. The crucial point
for the discussion in this work is not if the use of a mobile decreases pedestrians’
attention or if it makes it more dangerous to cross a street. The main point is the
empowerment of a discourse born in mid-1920’s that changed the focus of danger
from the automobile and driver’s responsibility, and helped create car-centred cities.
About that change of perception, Sakuraba cites a Brazilian philosopher’s
statement that the cell phone is a value in Western society, since people risk dying in
order to check their devices while driving. Sakuraba points out:
People risk their lives, [the philosopher] says, for the cell phone. It is
interesting in this thought how car driving is taken for granted, while using
the cell phone is not. If a person is driving a car and, distracted, hits a wall,
the damage will be extremely different from if the same person were walking
and hit the same wall. The factor of danger for [the philosopher], however,
is the cell phone, because the car is too integrated in our modern daily
commute to even be noted.
In fact, nowadays, when somebody is hit by a car, many elements may be
considered as the cause. Was the driver drunk? Were the road conditions
appropriate? Was the pedestrian jaywalking? These are questions that might
arise, and they show that the blame for a person’s death may be put on
either the motorist, the municipality or the pedestrian themselves. Naturally,
many other actors might be blamed depending on the circumstances. 329

Questions like those are common and obvious for our society today. As seen
in the first chapter, during the early days of the conventional car, they would sound
illogical. It was very clear for citizens from that time that the car was to blame without
questioning the acts of the pedestrian. To walk was a necessity, to drive was a luxury.
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Even though they are proposed with good intentions, bills like Phones Down,
Heads Up Act deviate the public debate from a more complex system of causes and
effects to a more simple, easy and digestible debate that centres on the culpability of
the most vulnerable part of the equation. It contributes to the “common sense” that
cars’ right to use the streets are greater than other means of transportation.
That said, it is necessary to note that, obviously, it is not the intention of this
work to encourage people to cross streets looking to a screen without attention to the
traffic. That surely can be fatal but not simply because of the pedestrian act. Most of
the time, it is dangerous due to the design of the streets and a culture that in general
incentives speed and closes its eyes to pedestrians’ right of way. That fatal risk, as seen
in the previous sections of this work, is exactly what makes pedestrians look both ways
and many times — even when they have the right of way — yield to the car.
The bill Phones Down, Heads Up, just like the “petextrian” advertisement, was
not proposed with robot cars in mind. Both, however, despite coming as responses to
new technologies and new behaviours, evoke century-old concepts. In addition to the
examples in this chapter, it is fair to raise doubts about how all this will fit with the
brand new car and new behaviours — including the car’s behaviour — that may come
with it.
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3.4 – Necessary debates for a better future
The conventional automobile was not born with safety as its core
characteristic. In fact, social safety and legal concerns were raised by the “outsiders,”
— pedestrians, parents, downtown businessmen, and authorities — not by the
industry and aficionados. Historically, for financial reasons, manufacturers were
resistant to design changes and implementations that could increase safety, and when
such changes were applied they were mostly to the protection of the passengers, not
pedestrians or cyclists. Now, with autonomous systems and safety argument,
manufacturers are in the front line in the defence of general safety, not only of the
passengers, but everyone. From the beginning until now, cars have been seen as
inherently dangerous. That is why in many countries a person must be at least 16 years
old and pass various levels of exams to be authorized to drive. Driverless cars, by
contrast, are coming under the premise that they will be so safe that persons with
severe vision impairment and unsupervised children will be able to use it. If that ever
become the reality, how can it shift the cultural vision of the automobile?
The situation today is quite blurry because a kind of blending between two
antagonistic strategies to sell one product is ascending. From the mid-1920s, cars have
been sold as symbols of freedom and individuality. In advertisements, cars are
constantly connected to power, high speeds and roads free from obstacles. Even their
appearance is designed to give the visual perception of velocity and strength. Those
are exactly the attributes that make cars dangerous and deadly. Those qualities and
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representations unified with cities designed for automobiles made cars one of the
most desired and needed products for the last hundred years. Suddenly, the strategy
for the new car - the robot-car - is in many aspects the opposite of that old one. Now,
the focus is not on high speed nor power, but cautiousness and safety; not on the
excitement of having the freedom to control the wheel, but on the freedom from the
wheel, freeing hands and eyes to use the phone or watch a movie.
Even if the whole industry shifts from individual car ownership to ride-hailing
service, in the end, they will probably still have to sell the idea that cars are a better
way to move in the city than public transit, walking or cycling. With the possibility of
connection between cars, one promise of the driverless future is the end of traffic jams.
Since cars would be able to communicate with each other, they would mathematically
create an intelligent net of driverless cars that would move in coordination, with no
delays or long stops. One important question is: where the unpredictable pedestrians
and cyclists fit into that math? Theoretically, it is possible. Pragmatically, this possibility
is probably not going to be a reality any time soon. For how long will investors patiently
wait to see their investments become profit?
Even when the evolution of the technology gets to the point that it is indeed
unquestionably safer than human drivers, it is virtually inevitable that beneath millions
of machines some may malfunction once in a while, especially in the early days of
adoption. The results are usually highly different between a crash involving a car
moving at 50km per hour and a crash involving a car moving at half of that speed. In
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collisions involving pedestrians, the design of the car is also relevant: pedestrians hit
by SUVs are twice more likely to die than in collisions with cars of other sizes. 330
Failures and crashes are still going to happen “as a matter of physics, or
technology errors (such as improper servicing or software bugs), or technology
limitations, or other causes,”331 even if at a much lower level. If the objective of the
society is to have the lowest levels of fatalities, those many aspects that influence
deaths and injuries on roads must be part of the debate. Instead of questioning how
to simply adapt the technology to the society we have today — with the mobility
values constructed along the last century — maybe the central aspect toward that
objective should be questioning how we can use it as an unique opportunity to replace
what attracts us in the automobile — speed, power, and egotistic individuality — for
values more adequate to the construction of a safer and fairer society.
Professionals involved in driverless car projects are pursuing a better society
where deaths and injuries on roads are a problem of the past. It is difficult, however,
to escape from the reality those projects are made within an industry that has in many
countries (including Canada), a decisive weight in the economy, employment rates,
and GDP’s growth. Even though their leaders and employees are in the pursuit of
perfect cities and a world that respects pedestrians, bicyclists, people with disabilities,
children and elders, as companies — and competitors in a market with huge players
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— profit is for many the first interest, and unquestionably imperative for companies’
survival. Companies must respond to their investors, and the best response is to give
them great, constantly growing profit margins, and the sense the company has a
stable future ahead.
During the last century, as seen in the first chapter, the automotive
manufacturers, seeking the rapid growth of the industry, created campaigns to shift
the roles of pedestrians and cars, leading us to a car-centred society. Connecting that
to the emergence of driverless cars, Stilgoe writes that the
early experience with automobiles is a cautionary tale of how, if society does
not pay attention, technologies can emerge so that their flaws become
apparent only in hindsight. The car did not just alter how we moved. It also
reshaped our lives and our cities. Twentieth-century urban development
took place at the behest of the internal combustion engine. Cities are still
trying to disentangle themselves from this dependence.332

Learning from the past, it is fair questioning how much companies and
investors are willing to embrace an Utopia if it means to create a society where the
non-motorized and the public transit are in the centre of the urban mobility and
planning.
In the last decades - facing the various problems created by the centrality of
the car in the urban development - citizens, authorities, and important leaders of the
automotive industry, are pushing for changes in the urban environment.
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As William Clay Ford Jr. stated in 2011333:
The problem […] is one of mathematics. […] Our transportation system
simply won’t be able to deal with [this]. We’re going to create the kind of
global gridlock that the world has never seen before. […] It’s clear that the
mobility model that we have today simply will not work tomorrow. Frankly,
four billion clean cars on the road are still four billion cars, and a traffic jam
with no emissions is still a traffic jam […] So what’s going to solve this? The
answer isn’t going to be more of the same. [The] answer to more cars is […]
not to have more roads. When America began moving west, we didn’t add
more wagon trains, we built railroads […] Today we need that same leap in
thinking […] The solution is not going to be more cars, [or] more roads […]
We must have an infrastructure that’s designed to support [a] flexible future.

Reports and studies show driverless cars can revolutionize the world. The
change, however, to be fairly called “revolution” must transform not only the deaths
and injuries statistics, but also the whole status quo constructed around the
automobile in the past century. Otherwise, we will not be using the full potential of
this technology to help build fair and efficient cities.
To achieve that objective, our society must propose ideas and projects that
are not mere shortcuts that promote more of the same. If we give up the promises
raised with the safety argument to aiming a rapid deployment, we may deepen some
problems we have today. As Rodney Brooks wrote:
If changing everyone’s behavior is on the table then let’s change everyone’s
behavior today, right now, and eliminate the annual 35,000 fatalities on US
roads, and the 1 million annual fatalities world-wide. Let’s do it today, and
save all those lives.
[Some] suggests having the government ask people to be lawful. Excellent
idea! The government should make it illegal for people to drive drunk, and
then ask everyone to obey that law. That will eliminate half the deaths in the
US immediately. Let’s just do that today!334
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In this same sense, historian of technology Dan Albert, in an interview for
CNBC said:
One of the things I often hear from people is when an autonomous vehicle
is better than the fiftieth percentile drivers on the road, we have the absolute
responsibility to let them on the road. […] It presents a problem, which is
people dying on the road or crashing and so forth, and saying, well,
therefore, you need this solution. But of course, there are a lot of solutions.
A lot of the promises about autonomous vehicles are around congestion
and particularly safety. […] There’s a much less exciting solution to road
deaths, particularly in urban areas, and it’s called Vision Zero. And the
premise is pretty straightforward. It says, let’s start with safety and then let’s
add mobility. The current idea around driving, around cars, is let’s get as
much mobility as we can and then let’s start to make things safer. Whether
or not autonomous vehicles are safer than human drivers is in a lot of ways
beside the point. They’re more lucrative than selling cars to people. They’re
more lucrative than selling rides by human beings.335

There is one important debate that runs through some discussions in this
work and that may help trace the paths of the technology and how it may change or
deepen some social relations in our society.
Professor Thomasen raises a discussion about the relation between robots
and public space, and the intersection between law, space and society. She argues in
favour of studies about how the deployment of robots may interfere in the regulation
and the nature of public spaces, proposing questions like “how does law shape a space
or the experience of a space? What is a public space?”
Regulators, […] lawmakers, real decision-makers who come up with the rules
for how robots can be used, who can use robots, and what laws protect
robots, will be imposing a particular vision of public space through those
rules, through the permission of robotic systems in different places. […] How
CNBC, “Inside The City Where Waymo Tests Self-Driving Vehicles”, (2019), online: CNBC
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should these regulators think about the task of regulating robots in public,
and importantly, I think, should any special considerations apply to the way
in which these robots given that they are operating in spaces that is meant
to be public, that is meant to be communal.336

It is possible to relate some of her thoughts with Balkin’s when he proposes
we should focus
on what features of social life the technology makes newly salient. What
problems does a new technology place in the foreground that were
previously underemphasized or deemed less important? What aspects of
human activity or of the human condition does a technological change
foreground, emphasize, or problematize? […] what are the consequences
for human freedom? […] We might say, then, that the most important lesson
of cyberlaw for robotics is the need to attend to the relationships between
affordance and imagination, between tools and relations of power, between
technological substrate and social use.”337

The driverless car and the pursuit of a driverless world may place a more clear
view of problems that have been neglected, and it is paramount to include debates
over public space and its nature, the relations of power and accessibility, with the
objective of reaching the full societal benefits that this technology may be able to
provide. As many studies and reports point out, there are still many unknowns about
a driverless future. The examples in this last chapter are not conclusive about the future
being a mere repetition of the past. They are relevant, however, as indicators that our
society must be alert about the paths the uncertainties of the present stage of the
technology can lead us. If lawmakers, policy makers, researchers and manufacturers
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use a new technology to simply reproduce old visions we may not be able to use the
technology toward a future that fulfil the promises of safety and equity.
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CONCLUSION

The relations and experiences we have with and on the streets of our cities
have not always been the way they are today. Conflict is a natural part of humanity
and has always existed in many aspects of the public life. The rise of the automobile
in the last century, however, elevated road violence to levels never seen before. In its
early days, the car was seen by many as an undesired guest and the responsible for a
carnage.
Through campaigns of public relations and associating it with an era of
economic and scientific progress, the image of the automobile shifted. It became a
symbol of power, speed, freedom and individuality. Through educational campaigns
and law enforcement, the roles of pedestrians and cyclists also changed. The word
“jaywalker” was established to create the image of the pedestrian that does not respect
the space owned by cars. Following society’s trends, courts also made a shift and
started to use jaywalking to justify the harm suffered by a pedestrian. In the same way,
courts have assumed that cyclists should have no right to compensation when
considered to have done a “foolish thing” and therefore was “the sole author of his
misfortune.”
The driverless car is appearing as the solution to many problems associated
to the automobile. Silicon Valley’s companies and traditional automobile
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manufacturers are in a race to create driverless cities. The safety argument is the most
used selling point of the technology.
The predictions for the wide use of these robots are constantly changing and
pushed to the future because some problems are more difficult to solve than at first
glance. The unpredictability of human behaviour is one of the challenges that may
delay the deployment of these robots in cities, especially in big urbanized centres.
Although the technology has potential to revolutionize our world in many significant
aspects, the fact that these robots are also automobiles – or are seen as automobiles
– may limit our vision of the potential uses for it and also potential problems that may
appear only after a few years after the deployment. In its early years, automobiles were
commonly called horseless carriages. Today, no one would consider an automobile a
mere type of carriage or wagon.
I say “or are seen as automobiles,” because I want to leave open the possibility
that in the future, we may see it as another kind of machine, though part of the same
family. We can use the rise of the smartphone as an analogy. Smartphones were not
seen as a completely new thing, they were seen as a huge improvement of telephones.
With them, however, many new unpredicted uses and concerns arouse, from
addiction to distraction, changes in society’s overall productivity, and even the
interference in children’s brains development. Today, smartphones are more related
to computers than to telephones. In a similar way, with the heavy use of robot-cars in
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the society, we may have many new challenges that we cannot see or understand at
the present.
Because we cannot predict the future, and probably have a limited vision of
the outcomes of the technology, and also the companies and governments are under
the pressure of becoming the first ones to deploy the driverless car, we may feel
tempted to use old methods to create an environment and legal framework safe for
the technology through segregation and law enforcement that could make humans
more predictable.
Although during this work the word “utopia” has appeared, the crux of what
I am proposing with these thoughts is not to create predictions about a perfect or a
terrible future. We will not become an utopia or dystopia. What is proposed, however,
is a mental effort to look for probable flaws not simply of the technology in the stage
it is today, but flaws of the discourse that is used to promote its use. Pushing a bit
harder, we may even question ourselves if some aspects of what we today consider
as flaws of the technology are considered like this because we frame it under premises
of a society whose values are base in the centrality and needs of the automobile of
the last century. Citing Balkin:
We might identify many different features of a technology as its key or
essential characteristics, but the real issue is always why we care about them.
How we define the central features of a technology depends on what our
definition is for, and the purpose it serves in our particular area of inquiry. 338

338

Ibid.
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To conclude, if the objective is to eliminate as much as possible the fatalities
on the roads and to pursue equity and accessibility, we must not simply search for
better forms to evaluate if driverless cars are safer than human drivers and better
performers in unpredictable events. Those searches are important and necessary. It is
also important and of great value that companies and governments put safety as the
main argument for the technology. This is a paradigm shift in relation to the selling
points of the conventional automobile. It is, however, necessary to amplify the debate
to include other social aspects that can aggregate visions over the technology, and
also question some established assumptions.
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